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Abstract 
 
The goal of this thesis is to determine under which circumstances a supernatural 
hypothesis should be preferred over the most probable natural hypothesis to explain a set of 
historical facts. The supernatural hypotheses include the objective vision hypothesis and the 
resurrection hypothesis, while the subjective vision hypothesis is taken to be the most probable 
natural hypothesis. Each of them can be found in the recent literature on the Resurrection and is 
still advocated by major proponents. The facts by which these three hypotheses are judged are 
agreed upon by most scholars. They include (1) Jesus’ death by crucifixion, (2) the disciples’ 
claim that Jesus was raised and appeared to them alive after his death, and (3) the transformative 
experience of Paul. This thesis argues that, unless it is extremely improbable that God exists and 
that He would raise Jesus from the dead, the best historical explanation for the set of historical 
facts herein considered is that Jesus appeared alive in bodily form after being crucified. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis explores under which circumstances a supernatural hypothesis that seeks to 
explain three major historical facts concerning the Easter events should be preferred over the 
most probable natural hypothesis, the subjective vision hypothesis. The argument of this thesis is 
that, if it is a priori sufficiently likely that God exists and that He would raise Jesus from the 
dead, then the bodily Resurrection of Christ is superior to the most likely alternative natural 
explanation that these experiences resulted from subjective visions of some sorts. Or, expressed 
in more probabilistic terms, if the prior probability of the Resurrection is more than “extremely 
improbable”,1 then the resurrection hypothesis is the most probable hypothesis and should, 
therefore, be preferred over the most likely natural hypothesis. 
The thesis unfolds in the following way. In chapter 1, different approaches for examining 
explanatory hypotheses for the Easter events are described and compared. More specifically, 
reasons are given for why a Bayesian approach should be preferred over an inference to the best 
explanation approach. In addition, objections against the Bayesian approach are considered and 
the methodology is laid out in more detail. Perhaps the central advantage of the approach lies in 
its ability to adequately capture worldview issues and how they affect the probability judgement 
of the hypotheses. For those hypotheses that involve supernatural elements such as God’s 
existence and the likelihood of raising Jesus from the dead, the probability is expressed as a 
variable. This will later allow us to say under which circumstances such a hypothesis becomes 
more likely than the most probable alternative natural hypothesis. 
 
1 For the numerical values, see table 2. canon of probabilities in the appendix. 
2 
Chapter 2 focuses on the historical facts pertaining to the Easter events. It starts with a 
definition of the term historical “fact.” The chapter proceeds with a description of how such 
historical facts can be identified. Even though more facts concerning Jesus’ death and 
Resurrection could be identified, they include for the purposes of the present investigation: (1) 
Jesus’ death by crucifixion, (2) the appearances of the risen Christ to various individuals after his 
death, and (3) the change brought about in Saul of Tarsus, a former persecutor of the Christian 
church, such that he started to proclaim the gospel as a result of what he believed to be a personal 
encounter with Jesus. These three facts are accepted by a large majority of scholars in this field.2 
Then, in chapter 3, three explanatory hypotheses for the aforementioned historical facts 
are discussed. They include: (1) subjective vision hypothesis (SVH), (2) objective vision 
hypothesis (OVH), and (3) resurrection hypothesis (RH). For each of them, a probability 
estimate is formed for how likely these facts are to be expected. Moreover, for the natural 
hypothesis the prior probability is estimated, whereas in the case of those hypotheses that involve 
a supernatural element, the prior probability is expressed as a variable and thus not estimated, as 
the goal of the approach is to find out how high that probability needs to be such that any of the 
supernatural hypotheses is rendered more probable than the most probable natural one. 
Finally, the results of the probability estimates are displayed and summarized in chapter 
4. In this chapter the minimal value for the prior probability of the supernatural hypotheses is 
computed and the relationship of the factors that affect this prior probability is displayed 
graphically. This allows us to show under which circumstances a supernatural hypothesis should 
be preferred over the SVH.  
 
2 Gary R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus & Future Hope (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 9–10. 
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Chapter 1 – Bayes’ Theorem in Historical Research 
 
Theism, Jesus’ Resurrection, and Bayes’ Theorem 
When evaluating various hypotheses that account for a set of historical data, historians 
commonly examine and compare these hypotheses based on their explanatory character. This is 
referred to as explanationism. A classical explanationist approach is the inference to the best 
explanation (IBE). Bird defines IBE as a view according to which a hypothesis is accepted 
because it provides a better explanation than the rival hypotheses.3 
IBE is applied by various scholars for comparing various hypotheses such as the 
hallucination, fraud or RH concerning the Easter events. McCullagh suggests that historians 
should judge the explanatory fitness of an explanation based on the (1) plausibility, (2) 
explanatory scope, (3) explanatory power, (4) disconfirmation by other beliefs and (5) ad 
hocness.4 
One problem of the RH when employing an IBE approach to the case of the Resurrection 
concerns the plausibility and ad hocness of the hypothesis. Licona captures the issue in stating 
that an atheist historian would find that the Resurrection is implausible; while a theist may think 
that it is plausible, since God can intervene in history.5 If atheism is presupposed, then RH 
becomes more ad hoc because it adds the supposition that God exists. Moreover, if someone 
 
3 Alexander Bird, Inference to the Best Explanation, Bayesianism, and Knowledge, vol. 1 (Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 98, accessed May 27, 2019, 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198746904.001.0001/oso-9780198746904-chapter-7. 
4 C. Behan McCullagh, The Logic of History: Putting Postmodernism in Perspective (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2004), 51–52. 
5 Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2011), 153. 
4 
believes that the arguments for God’s existence are not convincing, the RH appears less plausible 
to that person. 
But on the IBE, it is unclear how arguments from (negative) natural theology6 should be 
factored into such an investigation. Licona thinks that on the basis of, for instance, teleological 
arguments for God’s existence, a historian would be epistemically justified in embracing a 
theistic worldview and consequently in arriving at a supernatural explanation such as the RH.7 
Nevertheless, he suggests that historians should neutralize the horizon (i.e. the influence of 
worldview on the historian’s judgement) and start from a neutral position by neither 
presupposing nor excluding theism.8 Craig disagrees with the latter and argues that the 
plausibility of the RH should be judged in context of arguments of natural theology.9 
What is even more troubling, however, is that the plausibility and ad hocness ultimately 
appear to decide which hypothesis is favored by a historian. Swinburne suspects that “most 
people who think that the total evidence is against the traditional account [i.e. Jesus’ 
Resurrection] do so, I believe, because they think the background evidence makes a Resurrection 
very improbable.”10 For instance, even though McCullagh agrees that the RH fares better in terms 
of explanatory power and scope, he holds that it is less plausible and more ad hoc than 
 
6 The term (negative) natural theology highlights that arguments against God’s existence (i.e. negative 
natural theology) also need to be taken into account and not only arguments for God’s existence (i.e. natural 
theology), as Cavin and Colombetti argue. See Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti, “Swinburne on the 
Resurrection: Negative versus Christian Ramified Natural Theology,” Philosophia Christi 15, no. 2 (2013): 253–
263. 
7 Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 159. 
8 Ibid., 157 and 160. 
9 William L. Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway 
Books, 2008), 397. 
10 Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29. 
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alternative explanations and therefore dismisses it.11 But the plausibility and ad hocness of an 
explanation depends on the historian’s presuppositions and worldview. A supernatural 
explanation does not require an additional element, namely God, and does, therefore, not become 
ad hoc because it is already part of a theist’s framework, as Craig notes.12 One of the reasons why 
theistic and atheistic historians come to different conclusions concerning Jesus’ Resurrection 
despite following a similar methodology by applying McCullagh’s criteria is because the IBE 
itself does not provide sufficient guidance as to how arguments from (negative) natural theology 
are to be taken into account and weighed against each other when comparing the hypotheses. In 
fact, this may be the main reason for why scholars continue to differ on which hypothesis 
regarding the Easter events provides the better explanation. The historical investigation of Jesus’ 
Resurrection can be advanced, if a method is provided that accounts for how arguments for and 
against God’s existence influence the historian’s judgement of the plausibility and ad hocness of 
a hypothesis. Such a method could enable the historian to determine under which worldview and 
presuppositions a hypothesis fares better or worse than competing hypotheses. 
Bayes’ theorem provides the guidance that the IBE lacks in this respect, when it comes to 
how these factors are to be accounted for when comparing the hypotheses. To see the difference 
between the two approaches, we shall introduce the following distinction. Lipton distinguishes 
between the “loveliest” and the “likeliest” explanation. 
The loveliest explanation is the one that provides the most understanding.13 IBE belongs to this 
 
11 C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 21. 
12 Craig, Reasonable Faith, 398. 
13 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2004), 59. 
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category, since it is explanationist by its very nature (particularly due to the aspects explanatory 
power and scope). Although McCullagh’s criteria allow historians to consider the plausibility of 
a hypothesis and to thereby take into account the probability of an explanation to some degree, 
the approach does not clarify how these factors should then be weighed. Consequently, it is not 
purely probabilistic. 
The Bayesian view, on the other hand, clearly belongs to the second category (i.e. to 
those approaches that seek the likeliest explanation). This approach views evidence somewhat 
differently than explanationism. Day and Radick explain that on this account “evidence . . . is 
what renders hypotheses more or less probable . . . .”14 The view is based on Bayes’ theorem and 
can be expressed as follows: 
𝑃(ℎ│𝑒, 𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑒|ℎ, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒|𝑘)
 
The term on the left-hand side (lhs) is the posterior probability of a hypothesis h given the 
evidence e and the background information k. On the right-hand side (rhs) we have the 
probability of the evidence given the hypothesis and the background information (𝑃(𝑒|ℎ, 𝑘)),15 
the prior probability of the hypothesis given the background information (𝑃(ℎ|𝑘)),16 and the 
 
14 Mark Day and Gregory Radick, “Historiographic Evidence and Confirmation,” in A Companion to the 
Philosophy of History and Historiography, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009), 91. 
15 The term denotes the likelihood of encountering a certain piece of evidence e under the hypothesis h and 
when taking into account background knowledge k. In chapter 2, evidence is defined as actual data which is 
interpreted. For historical purposes, Tucker defines a hypothesis as “any historiographic proposition about past 
events.” Swinburne’s definition of background knowledge is helpful. He defines it as a sort of knowledge that can 
be taken for granted before considering any new evidence. Aviezer Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past: A 
Philosophy of Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), loc. 1835; Richard Swinburne, The 
Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16. 
16 This is the likelihood of a hypothesis given background knowledge but fully apart from specific 
evidence. In other words, it is the likelihood of a hypothesis before examining a specific piece of evidence.  
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probability of the evidence given the background information (𝑃(𝑒|𝑘)).17 This equation expresses 
that in order to compute or estimate the term on the lhs, the probability of the evidence under the 
circumstance of a particular hypothesis is needed. 
The plausibility of the RH depends on whether God exists or not. The likelihood of God’s 
existence can be expressed in terms of a probability. On a Bayesian model, this probability can 
be factored into the prior probability of Jesus’ Resurrection. Swinburne uses the following 
procedure. He computes the posterior probability of the incarnation 𝑃(𝑐│𝑓, 𝑘) based on a prior 
probability 𝑃(𝑐|𝑘), the latter of those is dependent on the probability of God’s existence 
𝑃(𝑡|𝑘):18 
𝑃(𝑐|𝑓, 𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑓|𝑐, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑐|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑓|𝑘)
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃(𝑐|𝑘) = 𝑃(𝑐|𝑡, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑡|𝑘) 
 
In Swinburne’s case, there is a dependency between the probability of the incarnation and 
God’s existence. The same, however, can also be applied to the Resurrection, because one causal 
explanation for someone being raised from the dead is that such an extraordinary event is caused 
by a supernatural agent (viz. God). It can be expressed as 𝑃(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) = 𝑃(ℎ𝑅│𝑡, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑡|𝑘), where 
ℎ𝑅 denotes the RH. This shows that Bayes’ theorem allows historians to account for the 
probability of God’s existence, while, at the same time, also taking into account the degree to 
which the evidence renders the hypothesis probable. One advantage of this approach is that we 
can account for the probability of God’s existence, when assessing different explanations for the 
 
17 This is the probability of the evidence given background knowledge while not assuming a certain 
hypothesis. 
18 The variable c refers to the incarnation of Jesus, t denotes theism, f indicates the strength of evidence for 
a historical aspect of Jesus’ life and k stands for background knowledge. See Swinburne, Resurrection of God 
Incarnate, 213. 
8 
data. If historians apply Bayes’ theorem to the Resurrection, they need to be clear about what 
value they assign to 𝑃(𝑡|𝑘). This clearly shows how the worldview affects the posterior 
probabilities. If the probability of God’s existence is believed to be higher, then the probability 
of the RH increases. 
This approach also provides guidance as to what degree the worldview (particularly the 
estimated probability of God’s existence) influences the probability judgement concerning the 
hypotheses that are considered. It seems reasonable to assume that historians should avail 
themselves of all sources of knowledge. But this would mean that if someone believes that there 
are sound arguments for God’s existence and 𝑃(𝑡|𝑘) is therefore not too low, then this should 
enter the equation. Thus, far from neutralizing the historian’s horizon by attempting to assign 
some value to 𝑃(𝑡|𝑘), to which everyone would agree, if there is even any such value,19 it should 
rather be clarified what assumption historians are making as they examine and weigh the 
evidence. In this way, the subjectivity is not only accounted for but can also be kept in check. 
Scholars offer a variety of alternative hypotheses. But this requires a way by which these 
hypotheses can be compared. As Gauch writes, “Projects on the Resurrection would be more 
meaningful, if they were more directly comparable.”20 Bayes’ theorem can be applied to multiple 
hypotheses, thereby allowing for such a comparison. The hypotheses can be compared in terms 
of their likelihood, since a probability 𝑃(ℎ𝑖│𝑒, 𝑘) can be computed for each hypothesis ℎ𝑖. 
Moreover, once the probability of each hypothesis is computed, the historian can either opt for 
 
19 Some other difficult issues associated with neutralizing the horizon in this respect are: (1) which value of 
𝑃(𝑡|𝑘) would represent a “neutral view” and (2) who gets to assign that value (e.g. historians, philosophers, 
theologians?). 
20 Hugh G. Gauch Jr., “Natural Theology’s Case for Jesus’s Resurrection: Methodological and Statistical 
Considerations,” Philosophia Christi 13, no. 2 (2011): 350. 
9 
(1) the most probable one or (2) one that exceeds a certain threshold value (e.g. 0.5), depending 
on the chosen strategy. 
But the hypotheses can not only be selected and compared based on the posterior 
probabilities. While 𝑃(𝑒|𝑘) does not depend on a particular hypothesis, the two multipliers 
𝑃(𝑒|ℎ𝑖, 𝑘) and 𝑃(ℎ𝑖|𝑘)  dependend on the hypotheses that are considered. For the relevant set of 
hypotheses, those values can also be compared with each other. Historians can, therefore, ask 
whether a certain set of evidence is more probable given hypothesis ℎ1 or ℎ2. Thus, if estimates 
are provided for each of those values, it becomes more transparent why a certain hypothesis is 
preferred.  
10 
Objections and Caveats 
There are several reasons for employing Bayes’ theorem to historical questions. 
Nonetheless, scholars also raise objections and point to difficulties associated with this approach. 
It can be argued that the Bayes’ theorem requires statistical probabilities. Since the Resurrection 
is a unique event, the probability of the RH is either zero or difficult to estimate. In any case, an 
argument for the RH that makes use of the BT fails. It should be noted though that even if this 
reasoning were correct, this would not prevent historians from applying a Bayesian approach but 
rather from embracing the RH. However, this line of argumentation is problematic for other 
reasons. 
This kind of objection stems from a failure to distinguish between different kinds of 
probabilities. There are physical, statistical and epistemic probabilities. According to 
Swinburne’s definition, the physical probability measures the degree with which an event is 
predetermined by previous events, the statistical probability refers to proportion in either an 
actual (e.g. votes in an election) or hypothetical class (e.g. coin tosses) and the epistemic 
probability as the measure by which one proposition is made more probable by another.21 
Consider the first form of this objection: The probability of the RH is lower than that of 
other hypotheses. Ehrman, for instance, reasons that since historians can only say what probably 
happened and miracles are the least probable events, lots of alternative explanations are more 
probable than the RH.22  Besides the fact that Ehrman might be presupposing a naturalistic 
worldview, it appears that he is thinking in terms of statistical probabilities. But if historians 
 
21 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 204–205. 
22 Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted: Revealing the Hidden Contradictions in the Bible (and Why We 
Don’t Know About Them) (New York: HarperOne, 2010), 175–176. 
11 
would merely think in those terms, it would mean that a unique event such as Columbus’ 
discovery of the Caribbean islands should be neglected over alternative explanations that are 
more common or likely in statistical terms. This is absurd. Consequently, the statistical 
probability of a Resurrection should not be compared with the probabilities of alternative 
hypotheses. Moreover, the likelihood of the Resurrection should also not be thought of in terms 
of physical probabilities. Since the Resurrection is a unique and supernatural event, one that is 
not predetermined by prior natural causes, the likelihood of its occurrence can also not simply be 
thought of in terms of physical probability. When the Resurrection is considered, the third kind 
of probability, the epistemic probability should, therefore, be considered instead. 
According to the second form of the objection, the probability of the Resurrection need 
not be low, but is difficult to estimate. After discussing the BT, Licona states that historians 
cannot employ statistical-inference arguments because the Resurrection is a unique event.23 He is 
clear that this does not imply that the Resurrection is improbable, but he thinks that we do not 
possess the kind of knowledge that is needed to estimate this value.24 This objection only applies 
if statistical probabilities are considered. But to go back to the previous example of Columbus’ 
discovery, it should be noted that historians need not necessarily think in terms of statistical 
probabilities (especially when unique or first-time events are examined). Instead, the probability 
of Columbus’ landing given the available evidence needs to be considered. In other words, 
historians can ask to what degree does the evidence render the probability of Columbus’ landing 
more likely. This is the epistemic probability. Consequently, once the distinction is applied to the 
Resurrection, theists need not provide statistics in order to demonstrate that Resurrections are a 
 
23 Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 119. 
24 Ibid. 
12 
rather common phenomenon (because epistemic rather than statistical probabilities are relevant) 
to be able to employ the BT. For these reasons, unless otherwise noted, the probabilities that 
enter the BT should be thought of as epistemic probabilities. 
Another frequent critique of the Bayesian approach argues that it is difficult to quantify 
the prior probability, according to Tucker.25 Applied to the Resurrection of Jesus, this critique 
suggests that it is difficult to estimate, for instance, how high the prior probability of a 
resurrection is, given the background information. This problem could theoretically be overcome 
by focusing on the ratios between the probability of the evidence given various hypotheses and 
the background knowledge (𝑃(𝑒|ℎ𝑖 , 𝑘)). McGrew and McGrew solely compute the Bayes factors 
(
𝑃(𝐹𝑖|𝑅)
𝑃(𝐹𝑖|~𝑅)
) for several historical facts 𝑓𝑖 surrounding the Resurrection. In their view, these Bayes 
factors are so top-heavy that they can even overcome a prior probability 𝑃(𝑅) of 10−40.26 In 
other words, they argue that the evidence for the Resurrection is so strong that it can overcome a 
very low prior probability. If this is the case, then the prior probability does not need to be 
quantified and the analysis can focus on estimating the likelihood of the evidence. 
Non-Christians who examine the evidence for the Resurrection in such a way would, of 
course, disagree that the evidence is so extraordinarily strong that the prior probability can be 
completely neglected. In fact, as noted above, the prior probability can be a major factor that 
decides which hypothesis is accepted, precisely because not all think that the evidence for the 
 
25 Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past, loc. 1900. 
26 Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the 
Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 
2009), 630, accessed January 28, 2019, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444308334.ch11. 
13 
Resurrection is so overwhelmingly high as the McGrews suggest.27 Therefore, the prior 
probability of the Resurrection should be considered. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that it needs to be estimated under all circumstances. It is correct that in case the 
probability of the evidence is not sufficiently strong and if one follows an approach similar to 
Swinburne in The Resurrection of God Incarnate (who only considers the probability of one 
hypothesis in isolation), then the prior probability must be estimated. In this case, Licona’s 
objection that “the prior probability of God’s raising Jesus from the dead is very difficult to get a 
handle on” remains.28 There is, however, an alternative approach whereby computing or 
estimating the prior probability of the Resurrection can be avoided. 
 To avoid the critique of neglecting the prior probability altogether or positing a prior 
probability for the Resurrection that is higher than a skeptic would allow, it is possible to 
compute the threshold value of 𝑃(𝑅) that renders the RH more probable than the best alternative 
hypothesis.29 This has several advantages. First, since the prior probability is dependent on other 
values (recall that the prior probability of the Resurrection depends on the probability of God’s 
existence), the exact, objective value of that probability or an estimate thereof based, for 
instance, on arguments from (negative) natural theology need not be provided. In other words, it 
is acknowledged that each person may assess this probability differently. This, then, leads to the 
second advantage. Anyone, irrespective of her worldview, can check whether she would assign a 
higher prior probability to the RH or not. Thereby it becomes evident how a historian’s horizon 
 
27 See, for instance, Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti, “The Explanatory Paucity of the 
Resurrection Theory,” unpublished manuscript under editorial review. 
28 Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 116. 
29 The approach is explained in more detail under the heading “Refined Methodology.” 
14 
ultimately affects their probability judgement of the hypothesis itself. Someone with a stronger 
inclination towards theism may think that the prior probability is higher than the threshold value, 
whereas a reader more inclined towards atheism thinks the prior probability ends up being lower 
than the threshold. This explains why some accept the RH as more probable, while others do not. 
The next objection is not necessarily an objection against the application of Bayes’ 
theorem per se. But it affects whether a hypothesis can be rationally held at all using this 
approach. In its original form, it seeks to establish that, when Bayes’ theorem is applied to the 
RH, it will not yield a sufficiently high probability such that one would be rationally justified to 
believe in the truth of the hypothesis. This reflects a point of disagreement in the discussion of 
Martin and Davis concerning the probability of the Resurrection.30 Martin supposes that the 
posterior probability of the RH, 𝑃(𝑅│𝐸, 𝑇), needs to be larger than 0.5 to be rational.31 Even 
though Martin applies it primarily to the RH, it would obviously also apply to other perhaps 
natural hypotheses that are less probable than 0.5. With respect to the Resurrection, Martin 
reasons that if the prior probability is low (Martin works with 10% and 1%), the historical 
evidence would have to be very strong to yield a posterior that is greater than 0.5.32 Davis, on the 
other hand, maintains that it is rational to accept the most probable hypothesis, even if its 
 
30 The preceding discussion includes the following journal articles in which Martin represents the atheistic 
and Davis the Christian or theistic side of the debate: Michael Martin, “Why the Resurrection Is Initially 
Improbable,” Philo 1, no. 1 (1998): 63–73; Stephen T. Davis, “Is Belief in the Resurrection Rational? A Response to 
Michael Martin,” Philo 2, no. 1 (1999): 51–61; Michael Martin, “Reply to Davis,” Philo 2, no. 1 (1999): 62–76; 
Stephen T. Davis, “The Rationality of Resurrection for Christians: A Rejoinder,” Philo 3, no. 1 (2000): 41–51; 
Michael Martin, “Christianity and the Rationality of the Resurrection,” Philo 3, no. 1 (2000): 52–62. 
31 Michael Martin, “The Resurrection as Initially Improbable,” in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the 
Grave, ed. Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 45. 
32 Ibid., 45 and 50. 
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probability is lower than 0.5, as long as that hypothesis is not highly improbable.33 This 
disagreement requires a qualification as to how the posterior probabilities are compared and 
evaluated. 
In this study, we are concerned with finding the most probable explanatory hypothesis 
concerning the Easter events, not necessarily one that is more probable than 0.5, for several 
reasons. First, as Tucker notes, the history of science shows that a hypothesis need not 
necessarily have a high posterior probability in order to be accepted, given that the alternative 
hypotheses have a lower probability.34 Second, particularly in historical studies, it seems 
questionable whether historians have to end up with hypotheses that are more probable than 0.5 
in order to be epistemically justified in holding the belief that the hypothesis is true. If this were 
the case, historians may have to remain agnostic about many other past events. Third, the barrier 
also seems artificial. If the probability is 0.4999, it is not rational to believe in the hypothesis. 
But as soon as it is only slightly increased by a tiny amount of 0.0001, that person is suddenly 
rationally justified in holding that belief. Fourth, the probabilities of multiple hypotheses need to 
be compared in any case, even if they are more probable than 0.5. If one hypothesis is far more 
probable than another (say 0.99 vs. 0.51), it seems ceteris paribus more rational to opt for the 
more likely explanation. Consequently, it is reasonable to compare the probabilities of the 
hypotheses, while limiting the pool of candidate hypotheses to those that are not too improbable. 
But they need not necessarily be more probable than 0.5 to be embraced. 
 
33 Stephen T. Davis, “The Rationality of Christian Belief in Resurrection: A Reply to Michael Martin,” 
Philosophia Christi 5, no. 2 (2003): 515. 
34 Aviezer Tucker, “The Reverend Bayes vs. Jesus Christ,” History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy 
of History 55, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 137. 
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 According to another sort of objection, some probabilities are suspected to “dwindle.” 
Plantinga considers the probability of a historical argument for a conjunction of Christian claims: 
(1) God reveals Himself or something about Himself, (2) Jesus taught something similar to what 
is claimed in the Gospels (Plantinga refers to this as G), (3) Jesus’ Resurrection, (4) God 
endorsed Jesus’ teachings by raising him from the dead, (5) the Christian teaching of Christianity 
beyond what Jesus taught is true, and (6) the church teaches G.35 When Plantinga attempts to 
estimate the probability of the conjunction of these propositions 𝑃(𝐺|𝑘), he ends up with a rather 
low probability of at least 0.35.36 Plantinga sees this as a result of the “principle of dwindling 
probabilities” (PDP). The more propositions are added, the higher the decrease in 𝑃(𝐺|𝑘) 
because the relevant probabilities need to be multiplied with each other.37  
 In response to the objection, it should first be noted that the objection need not 
necessarily apply to the RH. In fact, the Resurrection is merely one of the six propositions that 
Plantinga discusses. This reduces the number of propositions that need to be multiplied with one 
another and does not necessarily diminish the probability of the RH to the same degree as 
𝑃(𝐺|𝑘). Moreover, Plantinga attempts to answer a different kind of question. He seeks to find 
the probability of G given background knowledge k only. However, when the BT is applied to 
the Resurrection, by way of computing 𝑃(ℎ|𝑒, 𝑘), the evidence for both the Resurrection 
𝑃(𝑒│ℎ, 𝑘) and arguments from (negative) natural theology 𝑃(𝑡|𝑘) can be taken into account. 
The fact that the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence is computed has an 
 
35 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 274–277. 
36 Ibid., 279. 
37 Ibid., 280. 
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important implication. As soon as Bayesian updating is allowed for, the probability of a 
hypothesis can increase by adding more evidence. McGrew and McGrew explain it this way: 
Once one allows for updating on new evidence, all bets are off, as a new set of coherent 
probabilities will be generated every time one updates, and the initial estimate of the 
probability of theism on some minimal background evidence will constitute no upper 
bound on the probability of either theism or Christianity after all updates have taken place 
and all pertinent evidence is taken into account.38 
 
Thus, it is possible that the probability of the Resurrection increases, if more evidence is found 
that renders the hypothesis more probable. 
  
 
38 McGrew and McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles,” 648. 
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Refined Methodology 
In the previous discussion, various ways are explored by which approaches using Bayes’ 
theorem result in more transparency with respect to the historian’s worldview and a better 
comparability. In addition, the objections that are considered provide guidance as to what extent 
the methodology needs to be adjusted due to difficulties involved in applying such an approach. 
It is now time to clarify and specify how the Resurrection of Jesus is examined in this thesis. 
Bayes’ theorem, as already introduced earlier, serves as a starting point to compute the 
probability 𝑃(ℎ𝑖|𝑒, 𝑘) of each hypothesis ℎ𝑖 that is part of our set of relevant hypotheses for the 
Resurrection. 
𝑃(ℎ𝑖│𝑒, 𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑒|ℎ𝑖, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑖|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒|𝑘)
 
The next step is to specify how evidence is considered. Theoretically it is, of course, 
possible that hundreds of pieces of evidence are discussed. But since scholars do not agree on 
such a large number of items, it is reasonable to consider only strong evidence that is granted by 
a large majority of scholars. This approach resembles the “minimal facts approach” of Habermas 
and Licona, in which they make a case for the Resurrection based on those facts that are well 
evidenced and accepted almost universally amongst scholars.39 The exact pieces of evidence are 
identified and discussed in chapter 2. Since we include multiple pieces of evidence, 𝑒 is 
therefore replaced by the conjunction of the pieces of evidence 𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛: 
𝑃(ℎ𝑖│𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛, 𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|ℎ𝑖, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑖|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘)
 
 
39 Gary R. Habermas and Mike Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel 
Publications, 2004), loc. 243. 
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Swinburne considers only one hypothesis, namely the incarnation (even though that 
entails, but is not limited to, the Resurrection in his case).40 Apart from this, however, he follows 
an approach very similar to the one just laid out by taking the strength of the pieces of evidence 
𝑓𝑖 together and estimating them together as 𝑃(𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3|𝑐, 𝑘) and 𝑃(𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3|𝑘).41 But to improve 
the comparability of how the individual pieces of evidence affect the probability of the various 
hypotheses, the individual probabilities 𝑃(𝑒𝑖|ℎ𝑖) are needed. With these probabilities it is 
possible to compare the likelihood of specific pieces of evidence 𝑒𝑖 given hypothesis ℎ𝑖. 
One way to compute these probabilities individually, lies in computing the Bayes factors 
𝑃(𝐹𝑖|𝑅)
𝑃(𝐹𝑖|~𝑅)
. This is an approach taken by McGrew and McGrew. They argue that 
𝑃(𝑅|𝐹1,…,𝐹𝑛)
𝑃(~𝑅|𝐹1,…,𝐹𝑛)
, where 
𝑃(𝑅|𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝑛) denoting the probability of the Resurrection given multiple facts is much more 
probable than the negation of the hypothesis 𝑃(~𝑅|𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝑛) given the same facts:42 
𝑃(𝑅|𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝑛)
𝑃(~𝑅|𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝑛)
=
𝑃(𝑅)
𝑃(~𝑅)
⋅
𝑃(𝐹1|𝑅)
𝑃(𝐹1|~𝑅)
⋅ … ⋅
𝑃(𝐹𝑛|𝑅)
𝑃(𝐹𝑛|~𝑅)
 
There is an important underlying assumption behind this approach, namely that the 
probabilities of pieces of evidence combined are independent of each other. The McGrews note 
that it is permissible to work under this assumption, if the RH is rendered probable by the facts 
when considered in isolation, and if the independence assumption does not lead to an 
overestimation of the case in favor of this hypothesis.43 For the present case, whether this 
 
40 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 170. 
41 Ibid., 212. 
42 McGrew and McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles,” 595 and 618. 
43 Ibid., 618. 
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assumption is fulfilled needs to be considered for each hypothesis in turn at a later point (in 
chapter 4). 
The aforementioned approach is helpful, if only one hypothesis is considered. But in our 
case, we wish to compare multiple hypotheses. Assuming, for instance, that three pieces of 
evidence are considered, eight values must be estimated using this approach for each hypothesis. 
If we wish to estimate less probabilities and to thereby decrease the likelihood that some of those 
are under- or overestimated, another approach can be taken, namely one in which the suggestions 
from Swinburne and the McGrews are combined. Thus, independence is assumed between the 
conditional probabilities for the pieces of evidence. It can be expressed as follows: 
𝑃(ℎ𝑖│𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛, 𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑒1│ℎ𝑖, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒2│ℎ𝑖 , 𝑘) ⋅ … ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒𝑛|ℎ𝑖, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑖|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘)
 
The total number of variables that need to be estimated, if all three pieces of evidence are 
considered is reduced from eight to five. Yet, there is still some difficulty involved in estimating 
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘). But it can be overcome as soon as multiple hypotheses are considered and 
compared. To do so, the primary question pursued here needs to be reconsidered: Under which 
circumstances is the Resurrection of Jesus rendered more probable than the alternative 
hypotheses? Since 𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘) is not dependent on any hypothesis, its value does not 
affect which hypothesis is the most probable one. By identifying which two hypotheses ℎ𝑅 (i.e. 
resurrection) and ℎ𝑗  (i.e. the most probable alternative hypothesis) yield the largest numerator, 
the problem can be expressed using the following inequality: 
𝑃(𝑒1│ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒2│ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ … ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒𝑛|ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑅|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘)
≥
𝑃(𝑒1│ℎ𝑗 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒2│ℎ𝑗 , 𝑘) ⋅ … ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒𝑛|ℎ𝑗, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑗|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘)
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The terms 𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘) drop out by multiplying both sides of the equation by 
𝑃(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛|𝑘). By solving for 𝑃(ℎ𝑅|𝑘), the minimum prior probability of the Resurrection 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) is computed such that the RH is rendered more probable than the most likely 
alternative hypothesis ℎ𝑗: 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑒1│ℎ𝑗 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒2│ℎ𝑗 , 𝑘) ⋅ … ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒𝑛|ℎ𝑗 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑗|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑒1│ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒2│ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ … ⋅ 𝑃(𝑒𝑛|ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘)
 
To find out for which 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) the Resurrection hypothesis is more probable than the 
most likely alternative hypothesis, only four factors need to be estimated that are associated with 
ℎ𝑗  and three factors associated with ℎ𝑅, given three pieces of evidence. In sum, this is one factor 
less than in the case of the McGrews.44 
This approach allows for making a clear statement concerning the prior probability of the 
Resurrection. If the prior probability of a Resurrection, which, as discussed previously, is 
dependent on the probability of theism, is equal to or exceeds that value, then the RH (or any 
other alternative supernatural hypothesis such as the OVH) is superior. 
In determining the actual value of 𝑃(ℎ𝑅|𝑘), both theological and philosophical 
considerations are involved because it depends on the probability of God’s existence and the 
likelihood that God would supernaturally raise Jesus from the dead. This is not part of the 
historical investigation with which this study is concerned. Theologians and philosophers need to 
argue for and inform the historians of which actual value assigned to 𝑃(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) is reasonable. 
Ultimately, everyone who ponders whether Jesus was raised from the dead needs to consider 
these questions for himself. 
 
44 Ibid. 
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It should be noticed, nonetheless, that the historical investigation affects 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) and 
therefore which hypothesis should be preferred. Firstly, 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) is lower, if the total 
evidence is more probable under the resurrection hypothesis ℎ𝑅 compared to the hypothesis ℎ𝑗 . 
Secondly, a lower prior probability of the competing hypothesis ℎ𝑗  shifts 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅|𝑘) 
downwards. In other words, the lower these values are, the lower the burden of proof for those 
who claim that Jesus was raised from the dead and the higher the burden of proof for those who 
claim the contrary. The historical investigation is therefore essential for deciding which 
hypothesis is the most probable one, since evidence is what renders a hypothesis more or less 
probable. But what constitutes evidence for or against Jesus’ Resurrection is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 - Historical Evidence Pertaining to the Easter Events 
 
Defining Historical Facts 
In this chapter, several facts surrounding the events of Jesus’ crucifixion and 
Resurrection are identified. In the subsequent chapter, the hypotheses will then be judged based 
on how well they explain these facts. Many of the items denoted as “facts” in this chapter 
resemble the “minimal facts,” originally identified by Habermas. According to Habermas, the 
term designates events that are (1) more than adequately evidenced, usually by multiple lines of 
arguments, and (2) agreed upon by a high percentage (above 90%) of scholars in that field.45 
Although this approach is adopted, a greater emphasis is given to the first criterion (due to the 
reasons discussed below). Moreover, historical facts can be distinguished (as first- and second-
order facts) depending on the degree of evidence by which they are supported. But before 
addressing how these facts are identified, several arguments against the approach need to be 
addressed. 
One objection addresses the terminology entailed by this approach. The use of the term 
“fact” is criticized by Carrier. He argues that facts should clearly be distinguished from theories. 
He defines facts as “actual tangible artifacts (such as extant manuscripts and archaeological 
finds) and straightforward generalizations therefrom.”46 Understandably, he then disagrees that it 
is a fact that the first Christians found the tomb empty.47 While the question whether the empty 
tomb is a historical fact can be left aside at this point, it should be noted that the term “fact” is 
 
45 Gary R. Habermas, “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection of Jesus: The Role of 
Methodology as a Crucial Component in Establishing Historicity,” Southeastern Theological Review 3, no. 1 (2012): 
16–17. 
46 Richard Carrier, Proving History: Bayes’s Theorem and the Quest for the Historical Jesus (Amherst, 
NY: Prometheus Books, 2012), loc. 388. 
47 Ibid. 
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normally not defined in such a sense by historians. It is also usually not used to refer to 
manuscripts and evidence. Moreover, a fact need not necessarily derive from “straightforward 
generalization.” 
As Howell and Prevenier acknowledge, the “status of any ‘fact’ available to the historian 
is always insecure.”48 There may thus always be some uncertainty associated with the 
truthfulness of a proposition about the past. In the view of Howell and Prevenier, the historian’s 
task lies in constructing an interpretation about past events based on information that seems to 
have fact-like status.49 Defined in this way, facts are linked to the information contained in the 
evidence and they are items on which a historical interpretation is based. Tosh clarifies that 
historical facts are based on “inferences whose validity is widely accepted by expert opinion.”50 
Whether some information or proposition obtains fact-like status depends on the validity of the 
inferences. Carrier is correct in pointing out that facts need to be distinguished from theories. But 
facts should also be distinguished from evidences (such as primary sources and other artifacts). 
They represent a third category. In the remainder of this paper, the term “fact” shall, therefore, 
refer to well-evidenced propositions51 about the past, whereas the term “evidence” refers to the 
actual data from which the facts are derived. 
A more direct objection against the minimal facts approach is, according to Loftus, that it 
represents a consensus approach. In his view, more evangelicals are interested in the 
 
48 Martha C. Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 84. 
49 Ibid. 
50 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of History, 6th ed. 
(London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 154. 
51 “Well-evidenced propositions” are statements that are based on valid and widely accepted inferences. 
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Resurrection and it is, therefore, not surprising that many scholars accept these facts.52 Loftus is 
right in that the consensus depends on the structure of the scholars and this can shift over time. A 
consensus approach does not guarantee certainty of the conclusions. Interestingly, however, the 
skeptical scholar Carrier argues that consensus should be sought among experts.53 Licona agrees 
that consensus opinion can play an important role in determining the objectivity of the 
conclusions, if it derives from a group of scholars who have studied the relevant subject 
sufficiently.54 But even though consensus plays some role in the minimal facts approach, 
Habermas remarks that he “always held that the first [viz. the facts need to be well-evidenced] is 
by far the most crucial, especially since this initial requirement is the one that actually establishes 
the historicity of the event.”55 Hence, the main reason why something is considered a fact can be 
found in the strength of the evidence and not primarily in its widespread acceptance. 
The minimal facts approach is sometimes also criticized for not taking into consideration 
whether the New Testament is generally reliable. Loftus, on the one hand, accuses Habermas, 
Licona and Craig for isolating claims of Jesus’ Resurrection from the question concerning the 
reliability of Scripture.56 Likewise, in his discussion of Craig’s “four established facts” 
concerning the Resurrection, Gundry points out that widespread agreement amongst scholars 
with respect to these facts do not “erase the facts . . . that what we have are reports and that 
reports are spongier than whatever hard facts may underlie them.” If Scripture is less reliable, 
 
52 John W. Loftus, Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity, rev. and exp. ed. 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2012), 416. 
53 Carrier, Proving History. 
54 Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 64–65. 
55 Habermas, “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection,” 16. 
56 Loftus, Why I Became an Atheist, 415. 
26 
then perhaps the facts and conclusions should be subject to greater suspicion. McGrew, on the 
other hand, also criticizes the minimal facts approach, but for the opposite reason. In her case, it 
is because she thinks that the Gospels are reliable and, therefore, the case for the Resurrection 
should be strengthened by relying more on the accounts of the Gospels.57 
In response to these objections, it should be noted that one of the reasons why the case is 
based on the minimal facts is precisely because scholars disagree to what extent the scriptural 
passages about Jesus’ life are reliable. Moreover, even if it were possible to establish the 
reliability of a document, that would not be enough to establish the historicity of the events it 
describes, especially the miracle reports. As Habermas points out, “just because a work is 
generally trustworthy, it does not always follow that everything in it (and especially the 
supernatural) is true.”58 This means that each event in Jesus’ life needs to be examined 
separately. The minimal facts approach does precisely that. Moreover, biblical inerrancy is not 
presupposed. Instead, the sources are evaluated, and the evidence is weighed. Thus, contrary to 
Loftus’ claim, the reliability of the documents can thereby also be accounted for.59 
  
 
57 Lydia McGrew, “Minimal Facts vs. Maximal Data,” What’s Wrong with the World, February 21, 2015, 
accessed June 18, 2019, http://whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2015/02/minimal_facts_are_not_enough.html. 
58 Steven B. Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010), 99, accessed June 
17, 2019, http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5397364. 
59 It should be noted that based on this approach, one relies primarily on the Pauline epistles, most of which 
are regarded as authentic by critical scholars. The material contained in the Gospels is given less weight. But by 
focusing on the “best material,” the results derived from that material do not become less credible because later 
sources are omitted or given less consideration. 
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Sifting Through the Evidence 
Since it is reasonable to identify a list of facts pertaining to the Easter events, it should 
now be explored how these facts can be identified. The crux of the issue is when and why a 
proposition about the past is well-evidenced. According to Howell and Prevenier there are three 
preliminary requirements that need to be met, before a source is used as evidence: (1) the source 
should be comprehensible, (2) its setting (i.e. place and time) can be identified, and (3) it must be 
authentic (e.g. no forgery).60 The test for authenticity is commonly referred to as external 
criticism and is, as Tosh states, concerned with whether “the author, the place and the date of 
writing [are] what they purport to be.”61 For a document to be authentic, historians not only need 
to be able to trace it back to the author, but it should also be consistent with known facts and 
other primary evidence.62 
But even if a document is authentic that does not automatically render its content 
accurate.63 A document also needs to be reliable. Determining the reliability is part of what 
constitutes internal criticism. Furay and Salevouris suggest that it should be checked whether the 
author is in a good position to observe a particular event (e.g. eyewitness) and whether the report 
is not too far removed from the actual event (such that the memory could play tricks on the 
witness).64 Howell and Prevenier remark that some parts of a document can derive from 
 
60 Howell and Prevenier, From Reliable Sources, 43. 
61 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 124. 
62 Ibid., 125. 
63 Historians commonly distinguish sources as follows: (1) accurate and genuine, (2) inaccurate, (3) 
inauthentic (i.e. pseudo-originals), (4) pastiches, and (5) copies or pseudo-copies. See Howell and Prevenier, From 
Reliable Sources, 57. 
64 Conal Furay and Michael J. Salevouris, The Methods and Skills of History: A Practical Guide, 3rd ed. 
(Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2010), 145. 
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eyewitnesses, whereas others can be second-, third-, or fourth-hand and, therefore, the parts of 
the text can vary in terms of quality.65 But besides the way an author hears about an event, there 
are additional factors that influence his reliability. 
According to Tosh, the reliability of a document is strongly affected by the intentions and 
prejudices of its author.66 Cases in which intention can strongly affect the reliability of the reports 
are auto-biographies and political writings. Some prejudices and assumptions can be related to 
the culture of that time (e.g. the value of female testimony or the possibility of miracles), while 
others can be shared. Oftentimes prejudices shared between an author and the historian studying 
the text are more difficult to identify. In summary, reliability depends on whether an author is 
trustworthy and competent to report about the event in question. Ideally therefore, the minimal 
facts derive from testimonies of such kind.67 
In addition to the critical textual analysis of an individual source, available sources also 
need to be compared against each other. Historians can also use independent sources to examine 
their reliability. As Tucker states, “When independent evidence coheres repeatedly, it increases 
our confidence in the fidelity of all the independent sources.”68 Thus, the reliability of two 
independent sources is higher, if they agree with each other. However, when they disagree, the 
historian can prefer the more reliable source over the other, though not under all circumstances. 
Upon weighing and cross-examining different sources, they can then be combined to build a 
case. This way, even though a single eyewitness testimony can be very unreliable, Trueman 
 
65 Howell and Prevenier, From Reliable Sources, 65. 
66 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 129. 
67 Note, however, that this is only a necessary but not a sufficient criterion. 
68 Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past, loc. 2469. 
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explains that a strong cumulative case can be built, if various sources corroborate each other.69 
This also has important implications for a Bayesian analysis. Tucker explains that “when the 
prior probability of a hypothesis is low but at least two independent evidential sources such as 
testimonies support it, however unreliable each of the testimonies is, the posterior probability 
leaps to stratospheric heights.”70 In other words, given multiple independent attestation, the 
probability of a hypothesis given the evidence can overcome relatively small prior probabilities. 
Consequently, this aspect is crucial for the present analysis. 
Finally, a report needs to be judged in terms of plausibility. It should be asked what is 
probable and in accordance with common sense. This is perhaps where the historian’s horizon 
exerts the greatest influence. Howell and Prevenier suggest that when two sources contradict 
each other and neither of them can be verified independently, plausibility can be the decisive 
factor.71 As noted in chapter 1, the plausibility of the RH is one of the key factors that needs to be 
taken into account adequately. For this reason, the value of the prior probability of the RH is not 
specified in this thesis and is henceforth denoted by the variable 𝑃(ℎ𝑅|𝑘). This way it can be 
explored how the plausibility affects which hypothesis is preferred. Furay and Salevouris suggest 
that individual pieces of testimony should also be examined on the basis of their inherent 
probability.72 Hence, it appears reasonable to judge the hypotheses based on historical facts 
which are inherently probable, that is to say, they have a sufficiently high inherent probability. 
 
69 Carl R. Trueman, Histories and Fallacies: Problems Faced in the Writing of History (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2010), 57–58. 
70 Tucker, “The Reverend Bayes vs. Jesus Christ,” 136. 
71 Howell and Prevenier, From Reliable Sources, 72. 
72 Furay and Salevouris, The Methods and Skills of History, 145. 
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In historical Jesus studies, several additional criteria are commonly applied. They include 
the criterion of dissimilarity and embarrassment. If an event fulfills such a criterion, it is thought 
to be more likely to have occurred. Tuckett defines dissimilarity this way: “If a tradition is 
dissimilar to the views of Judaism and to the views of the early church, then it can confidently be 
ascribed to the historical Jesus.”73 But the criterion is criticized on various grounds. Carrier 
argues that our knowledge about Judaism and the early church is insufficient and too diverse so 
as to establish these differences and he reminds us that something attributed to Jesus does not 
automatically become true, only because it is unusual.74 Moreover, Bock points out the criterion 
presupposes a lack of relationship between Jesus, his Jewish roots, and his disciples.75 Thus, the 
value of this criterion is limited. 
The criterion of embarrassment, on the other hand, is met according to Craig, if a saying 
or event is “awkward or counterproductive for the persons who serve as the source of 
information for [it].”76 This criterion can be beneficial in historical investigations, even though its 
value is sometimes questioned. After mentioning that this criterion is an application of the legal 
principle of “statement against interest,” Carrier points out that courts increasingly require 
corroborating evidence before admitting testimonies based on this principle and that statements 
which meet this criterion should nevertheless be critically evaluated.77 Carrier is certainly right 
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that even if the criterion is met, the statement itself needs to be critically evaluated. However, it 
seems that if there were two testimonies, one of which meets the criterion, while the other does 
not, and all other things were equal, the first testimony should be preferred over the other. 
Moreover, if there were only one testimony, which fulfills the criterion, and any testimony to the 
contrary is absent, then likelihood of the testimony being accurate should also be higher than if it 
did not meet the criterion. Therefore, even though corroboration (as Carrier suggests) strengthens 
the case for the historicity of an event, it is not a requirement that must be met before the 
criterion of embarrassment can be applied. 
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The Facts 
After the brief survey of why and how certain facts about Jesus’ death and Resurrection 
are established, a handful of facts are now identified. At this point, a distinction needs to be made 
between first- and second-order facts, since there is better evidence for some propositions than 
for others. Later, when the hypotheses are examined individually, this distinction is taken into 
consideration. The first-order facts obtain a very high likelihood because they are supported by 
very strong arguments. These are the facts by which the hypotheses are judged. The second-order 
facts, on the other hand, may but need not necessarily be less secure than the first-order facts. 
They are still probable and can thus be adduced as part of the background knowledge when the 
first-order facts are discussed in relation to each hypothesis. 
Fact 1: The death of Jesus by crucifixion 
That Jesus died by crucifixion is not only uncontroversial but also beyond reasonable 
doubt. Before turning to the historical evidence, some archaeological data needs to be considered 
to see whether there is evidence for the Roman practice of crucifixions in first-century Palestine. 
In 1968 multiple limestone ossuaries were found in burial caves at Giv’at ha-Mivtar. Amongst 
the skeletal remains were also two calcanaen bones which were pierced by a large iron nail. In 
his examination, Haas finds a piece of wood below the head of the nail and concludes that the 
victims shins were intentionally broken and that the death resulted from crucifixion.78 These 
remains are dated to the late AD 20s, the time when Pontius Pilate served as governor of 
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Judaea.79 Moreover, even though the exact mode of crucifixion as interpreted by Haas has been 
questioned repeatedly, the crucifixion itself is not.80 
The practice of crucifixion is also historically well-documented. In his extensive survey 
of sources that are dated between approximately 200 BC and AD 300, Cook notes several 
common elements such as (1) torture prior to crucifixion, (2) (sometimes) victims carrying the 
patibulum (i.e. the horizontal part of the cross), (3) (occasional) placement of a titulus (i.e. 
placard) above the cross, and (4) the usage of ropes or nails for fixing a criminal to the cross.81 
These elements lend additional support to the possibility that Jesus was crucified. 
The historical sources that mention Jesus’ death can be grouped into non-Christian and 
Christian sources. The advantage of the non-Christian sources is that the writers do not consider 
themselves Christians. Thus, they may be less biased because of their religious views. A first 
examination of these sources serves as background information against which Christian sources 
can be checked. The writers include Tacitus, Lucian of Samosata, Josephus, and Mara Bar-
Serapion. 
Tacitus Cornelius (ca. AD 56-120) wrote his work Annals sometime between AD 115 
and AD 120. He covers, amongst other emperors, the life of Tiberius and briefly refers to Jesus’ 
death: 
Christus, the founder of the name, had undergone the death penalty in the reign of 
Tiberius, by sentence of the procurator Pontius Pilatus, and the pernicious superstition 
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was checked for a moment, only to break out once more, not merely in Judaea, the home 
of the disease, but in the capital itself, where all things horrible or shameful in the world 
collect and find a vogue.82 
According to Tacitus, the term “Christian” finds its roots in “Christus,” who suffered the 
death penalty, while Tiberius and Pilate held their respective offices. He associates its origin 
geographically with Judaea. That Tacitus is not too well-disposed towards Christianity is evident 
from the fact that he labels Christianity a “disease.” This decreases the likelihood that the report 
is embellished. Nevertheless, the value of the source should also not be exaggerated because it is 
not clear from where Tacitus obtained this information, not least due to the large time gap of 
approximately 90 years between the time of writing and the actual event. 
As with all other Greek or Latin writings, since they were transmitted through Christian 
scribes, it is possible that the documents were tampered with. But there are several reasons why 
the report is probably authentic. Williams notes that scribes generally copied the text faithfully 
and that it would have been difficult for later scribes to imitate Tacitus’ style of silver Latin.83 
Van Voorst adds that the passage is typically Tacitean in terms of style and content, that it fits 
into the context and that the likelihood of an interpolation is decreased by the fact that much of it 
is attested to in one of Sulpicius Severus’ writings already at the beginning of the fifth century.84 
Besides this, it seems unlikely that the passage was modified by a Christian scribe because of its 
negative tone and attitude towards Christianity. Thus, this source indicates at the very least that 
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by the time of the second century it was generally believed that Jesus was put to death under 
Pontius Pilate sometime between AD 26 and AD 36, when Pilate oversaw Judaea. 
Several decades later, Lucian of Samosata (ca. AD 115-200) addresses Jesus and his 
death in one of his satires The Death of Peregrine, written at around AD 165. Although some of 
the books attributed to Lucian are disputed, this satire is generally regarded as genuine.85 Without 
directly stating the name, Lucian refers to him as one, “whom they still worship, the man who 
was crucified in Palestine because he introduced this new cult into the world.”86 Shortly 
thereafter, he states, “. . . their first lawgiver persuaded them that they are all brothers of one 
another after they have transgressed once for all by denying the Greek gods and by worshipping 
that crucified sophist himself and living under his laws.”87 According to these passages, 
Christianity derives from Jesus, who was crucified in Palestine and is worshipped by his 
followers. His reference to Jesus as a “sophist” or wise man should probably be understood in a 
negative sense. Since it is likely that some of Lucian’s text is embellished for satiric effect, as 
Van Voorst points out,88 not too much weight should generally be given to certain details of the 
text. Notwithstanding this, the aspect of Jesus’ death in Palestine by crucifixion does not exhibit 
signs of embellishment. It is more likely that Lucian passes on information that is already widely 
known in the second century. 
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Josephus Flavius (ca. AD 37/38-100) was born in Jerusalem. He was a military 
commander and was captured by emperor Vespasian in AD 67. In Jewish Antiquities, it is stated 
that “Pilate, . . . , had condemned him [i.e. Jesus] to be crucified, [and] those who had in the first 
place come to love him did not give up their affection for him.”89 One of the reasons why the 
authenticity of the (surrounding) passage, known as Testimonium Flavianum, is disputed is 
because it sounds as if Josephus had converted to Christianity, despite the fact that Origen states 
that Josephus was not a Christian.90 Since it is mentioned that Jesus was a “wise man,” “the 
Messiah,” that he appeared to those who loved him after his death and that this was announced 
by the prophets, an interpolation is likely. The most common explanations are that either (1) 
parts of it,91 or (2) the passage in its entirety,92 result from Christian interpolation. The first is 
currently the majority position. But even if it is correct and Josephus mentioned Jesus, though in 
a somewhat different manner, it is difficult to determine whether the comment on Jesus’ death, 
as well as the details (i.e. the death by crucifixion and that it occurred under Pilate), go back to 
Josephus or not. Since there is too much uncertainty involved, the value of this source is low. 
Another passage in one of Josephus’ writings provides a valuable contribution to the 
issue of whether Jesus may have survived the crucifixion. In his book The Life, Josephus 
describes how he sees three of his acquaintances being crucified. Titus grants him permission to 
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take them down and they receive “the most careful treatment.”93 Despite this intense medical 
care, only one out of three survives.94 This statement is helpful in assessing the likelihood that 
Jesus may have survived the crucifixion. Hence, even if Jesus had survived the crucifixion and 
received the best medical care, it is unlikely that he would have recovered. What is more, since 
there are no references available which mention that Jesus was removed from the cross prior to 
his death and since there are no indications that Jesus received medical care afterwards, it is all 
the more improbable that Jesus would have survived the crucifixion. 
Sometime after AD 73, Mara Bar-Serapion wrote a letter in Syriac addressed to his son.95 
In it he mentions Jesus’ death, although he does not refer to him by name but rather calls him a 
“wise king:” 
For what else have we to say, when wise men are forcibly dragged by the hands of 
tyrants, and their wisdom is taken captive by calumny, and they are oppressed in their 
intelligence without defense? For what advantage did the Athenians gain by the murder 
of Socrates, the recompense of which they received in famine and pestilence? Or the 
people of Samos by the burning of Pythagoras, because in one hour their country was 
entirely covered with sand? Or the Jews by the death of their wise king, because from 
that same time their kingdom was taken away?96 
In this passage, various examples are given for how the killing of a prominent person (i.e. 
Socrates, Pythagoras, and the “wise king [of the Jews]”) is recompensed with tragedy. In contrast 
to the other two historical figures, the mode of execution is not stated in the third case. Since 
Jesus is equated with other “wise men,” this must be a non-Christian source. Theißen and Merz 
think that the term “wise king” goes back to Christian sources because this royal title plays an 
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important role in the birth (Mt 2:1ff) and passion narratives.97 The death of this “wise king” is 
associated with the time when the Jews lost their kingdom. The terms “taken away” suggest 
destruction and perhaps foreign occupation and are therefore likely an allusion to the fall of 
Jerusalem in AD 70. The author does not seem to be aware of the conflicts in Palestine around 
AD 132, 98 as is sometimes argued.99 Because the death of the king and the seizure of the Jewish 
kingdom are linked, a shorter time gap of less than a century between these two events should be 
assumed, such that people would see a causal link between the two. This makes it likely that the 
source still goes back to the last quarter of the first century. Hence, even though an exact date 
cannot be given, the Christian message of Christ’s death, Jesus’ royal entitlement and the view 
that his death was recompensed with tragedy for the Jewish people permeated larger parts of the 
Roman empire. 
In terms of potential bias, the ability of these non-Christian writers to report accurately 
about the event is not negatively affected by their religious beliefs or worldview.100 Moreover, 
there is no apparent reason why they should lie about or invent the event. It is possible that they 
obtained reliable information, although it is rarely possible to detect from where they obtained 
their information. Unfortunately, these writers are further removed from the actual event (in 
terms of time and place) than other available sources and their material is less likely to derive 
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directly from eyewitness accounts. Thus, earlier sources, even if they may be more prone to 
religious biases, need to be consulted and can be preferable. 
The Christian sources can be categorized into canonical and non-canonical sources. 
The earliest non-canonical Christian sources are found in the writings commonly referred to as 
Apostolic Fathers. “The name was given because it was assumed that disciples of the apostles 
wrote the works, a false assumption in nearly all, if not all, cases,” remarks Ferguson.101 This, 
however, does not mean that none of these writers knew at least one of the apostles. 
An early non-canonical, Christian source, in which Jesus’ death is mentioned, is 1 
Clement. According to Irenaeus (ca. AD 140-202), the letter was sent from the church of Rome 
to the church in Corinth at a time when Clement was (third) bishop of Rome.102 Irenaeus also 
indicates that Clement knew the apostles. He states, “. . . this Clement . . . wrote a most effective 
letter to the Corinthians . . . [setting forth] the tradition which it had recently received from the 
Apostles.”103 Irenaeus’ claim that Clement was the third bishop may be challenged by an 
alternative tradition according to which he was directly ordained by Peter and could, therefore, 
have been the second bishop.104 Nevertheless, the acquaintance with at least one of the apostles is 
thereby not invalidated. The letter is usually dated to AD 95-97,105 but there is also evidence that 
it may have been written earlier, shortly prior to the destruction of the temple in AD 70, because 
the text indicates that the temple is still standing and offerings are being made: 
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Not everywhere, brothers, are the sacrifices continually offered [emphasis added],  or 
vows or ⌊sin-offerings and trespass-offerings⌋, but only in Jerusalem, and even there, 
offerings are made not in every place, but before the temple, at the altar, the offering 
being examined for blemishes by the high priest and those doing the previously 
mentioned service.106 
Christ’s death is repeatedly referred to in 1 Clement. It says, for instance, “Because of the 
love that he had for us, he gave his blood for us, Jesus Christ our Lord, . . . and his flesh for our 
flesh, and his life for our lives.”107 Moreover, Jesus’ death is also alluded to in 1 Clement 16.3-14, 
where the Servant song in Isaiah 53:1-12 is cited and directly applied to Christ.108 This is thus 
another early source in which Jesus’ death is mentioned. But in contrast to the sources 
considered above, this one directly links the author to the apostles. In addition, the text states that 
the apostles received the gospel, which probably refers to a set of oral teachings, from Jesus 
himself.109 
Even though there are several sources that are dated earlier and could be considered part 
of the non-canonical Christian literature in which Jesus’ death is mentioned, only Polycarp’s 
epistle to the Philippians (Pol. Phil.) shall be discussed because, in his case, there is another 
potential link to the apostles. Polycarp (ca. AD 70-155) was a bishop of Smyrna in Asia Minor. 
Irenaeus refers to Pol. Phil. and provides several details concerning Polycarp’s association with 
the apostles and others who saw Jesus: “Polycarp . . . had not only been trained by the Apostles, 
and had conversed with many of those who had seen Christ, but also had been constituted by the 
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Apostles, Bishop over Asia, in the Church of Smyrna.”110 The current majority position with 
respect to the date is that there were originally two authentic letters, the first written around AD 
110 and the second around AD 135, which were later combined by someone else.111 But others 
argue that it should only be regarded as a single letter.112 In the latter case, the date of 
composition would have to be around AD 110, that is prior to Ignatius of Antioch’s martyrdom 
in Rome, since Polycarp mentions Ignatius’ letters.113 In Pol. Phil., Polycarp refers to Jesus’ 
death at the beginning of his letter to the church in Philippi. After mentioning that the Christian 
faith is based on a firm foundation, which was passed on over the years, he refers to Jesus’ death 
as follows: “. . . because of the secure root of your faith, being proclaimed from ancient times, 
[still continuing and bearing] fruit to our Lord Jesus Christ, who endured because of our sins, to 
reach even [a violent] death . . . .”114 
In summary, it can be concluded that as in the case of the early non-Christian writings, 
the non-canonical Christian writers around the beginning of the second century clearly indicate 
that Jesus was killed. In at least two cases (i.e. 1 Clement and Pol. Phil.), it is possible that the 
writers knew at least one apostle, who would have been in a good position to know whether 
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Jesus died or not and to therefore pass on reliable information. There are, however, still earlier 
sources that can be examined. 
Jesus’ death by crucifixion is reported in each of the canonical Gospels.115 Due to the 
wealth of information available on the authorship and dating of these four writings, these issues 
shall only be sketched. It is generally agreed that they were written sometime in the second part 
of the first century.116 Most scholars disagree that they are eyewitness accounts, amongst other 
reasons because of the discrepancies between the accounts.117 But this view continues to be 
challenged.118 If the mainstream position is correct and if the previously discussed non-canonical 
Christian writings are linked to apostolic testimony, this produces the counter-intuitive result that 
some of the later non-canonical Christian sources such as 1 Clement in which Jesus’ death is 
reported may more likely be linked to apostolic testimony than the earlier sources (viz. the 
Gospels). In any case, due to the approach taken in this study the current consensus opinion is 
presupposed and the testimony in the Gospel narratives is given less weight. Nevertheless, some 
remarks concerning the Gospels are in order, particularly since the descriptions fit well with 
what is known from a medical point of view. 
The Gospels report that Jesus died because he was crucified (Mk 15:37.39 and Lk 23:46). 
From a medical perspective, it is likely that Jesus would not have survived a crucifixion. 
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According to Edwards, Gabel and Hosmer, exhaustion asphyxia was one of the most common 
causes of death for crucifixion victims because the victim was required to lift the body up in 
order to exhale, thereby scraping with the scourged back against the wood and putting more 
weight on the tarsals and wrists, which were pierced by the nails.119 Understandably, this process 
was not only tiring but exceptionally painful and became increasingly so until the victim 
breathed his last. Hence, due to exhaustion the victim would, at some point, become unable to 
exhale. There are of course additional factors that may have contributed to Jesus’ death, 
including hypovolemic shock and acute heart failure.120 In any case, medical knowledge is in 
agreement with the reports in the Gospels that the crucifixion led to Jesus’ death. 
Finally, the crucifixion reports in Acts briefly need to be considered. Even though the 
composition of Acts is usually dated to the late AD 80s,121 many scholars think that some of the 
material is earlier. In this regard, one conspicuous feature of Acts is that it contains a large 
amount of speeches.122 Vermès argues that the teachings which are attributed to the early church 
in Jerusalem substantially mirror the thoughts of the first Jewish-Christian communities in 
Palestine.123 But the veracity of this position depends on (1) the degree with which ancient 
historians were permitted to invent or modify speeches and (2) to what extent those speeches in 
Acts reflect Lukan style and vocabulary. Allison circumvents these objections by pointing to the 
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core parallels between Acts 2:22-24 (“Jesus of Nazareth . . . you crucified. . . . But God raised 
him up.”) and Acts 4:10 (“Jesus of Nazareth, whom you crucified, whom God raised from the 
dead.”) and suggesting that these verses may preserve an early kerygma. Thus, similarly to 
Vèrmes’ claim, it may be that these speeches do reflect the early proclamation of the church in 
its essence. If this is so, then they do attest to Jesus’ crucifixion and death (by implication 
because he is also said to be raised).124 Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify to what degree this 
material was redacted and when exactly the material originated. Hence, Licona’s advice to be 
cautious and to practice restraint when appealing to this material should be heeded.125 However, 
even if it does not go back to the earliest years of the church in Jerusalem, the report of Jesus’ 
crucifixion and death should be dated no later than five decades after the event. In both cases, the 
probability of legendary development is lowered. 
To conclude, that Jesus experienced a violent death is rendered probable by the non-
Christian and the Christian but non-canonical sources alone. Jesus’ death by crucifixion is 
multiply attested by various sources that appear authentic and whose setting (i.e. time and place) 
can be identified with a reasonable amount of precision with the possible exception of Mara Bar-
Serapion. The wealth of sources that attest to Jesus death, deriving from a variety of writers 
within different contexts, renders it unlikely that prejudices or collusion led to fallacious reports 
concerning Jesus’ death. For some non-Christian sources, there is a time gap of several decades 
between the reported event and the time of writing. Hence, legendary developments cannot be 
completely dismissed, but it is rendered unlikely since their reports significantly overlap with the 
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testimony of earlier Christian sources.126 That Jesus was crucified is plausible considering 
archaeological and historical evidence that attests to the practice of crucifixion around the 
Mediterranean area around the first century, including Jerusalem. Moreover, given further 
historical and medical considerations, it is very improbable that Jesus survived the crucifixion. 
Fact 2: After his death, Jesus appeared to various disciples, James and Saul of Tarsus 
Several days after Jesus died on a cross at Jerusalem, various individuals reported that 
they saw him alive and that He was raised. But before examining the evidence that is available in 
favor of this claim, it should briefly be sketched what kind of evidence is not available. In 
contrast to the previous fact, there are no non-Christian sources that support this contention, 
except, of course, for the unlikely case that the Testimonium Flavianum is authentic. Multiple 
reasons can be given as to why not more non-Christian sources report these events. 
First, even though Jesus’ death is mentioned in some non-Christian sources, additional 
references to Jesus’ life are scarce, possibly because Greco-Roman writers lacked interest in this 
topic. Palestine was a relatively unimportant, small part at the edge of the Roman empire. Bock 
writes, “. . . from a Roman perspective, Jesus was a seemingly minor figure. He was a religious 
leader from an ethnic minority tucked away in a small, distant corner of a massive empire.”127 On 
the other hand, Jesus was seen as a trouble-maker from a Jewish perspective, as Bock observes.128 
If anything, it is rather surprising that some non-Christian sources mention Jesus at all. 
 
126 Additional early Christian sources include the references to Jesus’ crucifixion in the Pauline epistles and 
the pre-Pauline creeds, which could be adduced here as well. But to improve the readability of the thesis, those 
passages are discussed below because many of them refer to Jesus’ death and the resurrection appearances. 
127 Bock, Studying the Historical Jesus, loc. 848. 
128 Ibid. 
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With respect to the writers who do mention Jesus, it needs to be stressed that their neglect 
to mention the appearances is not the same as if they would have stated that there were no 
appearances. The latter kind of evidence would be particularly useful for making a case against 
the appearances. The claim that the silence of non-Christian sources, on the other hand, 
demonstrates that these appearances did not occur is an argument from absence. It is especially 
problematic in this case because the likelihood that Roman writers would write about Jesus and 
the literacy rate in first-century Palestine is relatively low.129 
Second, there appears to be a correlation between someone’s belief that Jesus was raised 
and that this person reports about these appearances. If someone reports that Jesus was seen 
alive, that person is likely to embrace the Christian faith or else the report may be suspected to 
result from interpolation. Therefore, this leads to the possibility that religious prejudices may 
exert influence on the author’s report concerning the events. But it needs to be stressed that the 
causality could go in the opposite direction, namely that the events themselves affect the author’s 
beliefs. In any case, it can be readily admitted that caution is needed when examining the reports 
historically. At the same time, historical evidence to the contrary (i.e. against the resurrection 
appearances) needs to be gathered. A strong case would include multiple, early eyewitness 
testimonies which indicate that the reports of the resurrection appearances are unreliable. 
Perhaps the earliest source that may testify against the resurrection appearances is found 
in Matthew 28:11-13, where the chief priests and the elders say to some of the guards that they 
 
129 Catherine Hezser, Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 496; Hezser 
hesitates to offer an exact estimate. However, she maintains that if literacy is defined such that it includes writing 
more than one’s own signature, then Jewish literacy rate was well below the Roman average of 10-15%. Given a 
broader definition, which includes people who could only read a few words and sentences and write their signature, 
the literacy rate would have been closer to the Roman average. William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy, 1st ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 173 and 281; Harris estimates the literacy rate of the Roman 
mid-republican times to no more than 10%. Unfortunately, he does not discuss Judaea in detail. But he notes that 
“the evidence about literacy is relatively good” and refers to Joh 7:14-15, Lk 4:16-17 and Joh 8:6-8. 
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should tell the people: “[The] disciples came by night and stole him [Jesus’ body] away while we 
were asleep.” Although it is not stated explicitly, the passage implies that the disciples lied about 
the appearances. According to the Gospel writer, this story circulated among Jews at the time of 
composition, which would be at some point in the second part of the first century.130 But if it is 
held that Matthew is not based on reliable and early eyewitness testimony, then the passage 
should not be given too much weight. Besides this source, there is no additional first-century 
source available which explicitly states that the reports of the resurrection appearances are 
unreliable. Thus, the proposition that the reports of these appearances is unreliable lacks multiple 
attestation, even if the Matthaean testimony is considered authentic and reliable. 
Unlike the case of the counterclaim that there were no post-mortem appearances, there is, 
however, more evidence in favor of the claim that various individuals reported to have seen Jesus 
after his death. In a first step, more general claims about Jesus being raised from the dead are 
considered. Then, in a second step, some of the earliest sources which contain reports of Jesus’ 
actual appearance(s) are examined. 
A formula that is related to Jesus’ Resurrection and can be dated with a higher degree of 
confidence appears in 1 Thessalonians. This is perhaps Paul’s earliest extant letter and could be 
dated to AD 41, although a later date of AD 50/51 is more likely.131 The formula in 1 
Thessalonians 1:10 reads as follows: “. . . to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from 
the dead, Jesus who delivers us from the wrath to come.” General declarative statements similar 
 
130 As evident in Justin Martyr’s dialogue between the Christian Justin and the Jew Trypho, this polemic 
was probably still used by the Jews in the second half of the second century. See Justin Martyr, Dialogue with 
Trypho 108.2. 
131 F. F. Bruce, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Volume 45, ed. Bruce M. Metzger et al. (Grand Rapids: 
HarperCollins, 2015), 35; M. C. Tenney, “First Epistle to the Thessalonians,” in The International Standard Bible 
Encyclopedia, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Revised. (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1979), 833. 
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to this one are repeated in numerous other passages (cf. Rom 4:24; 6:4; 8:11; 10:9; Gal 1:1; 1 
Cor 6:14; 15:15; and 2 Cor 4:14), usually following the structure “God (subject) + raised (verb) 
+ Jesus (object).” Since this recurring pattern appears already in the earliest Pauline epistle, the 
message that God raised Jesus probably pre-dates the New Testament writings.132 
Notwithstanding this, it is also correct that there is no direct indication of appearances in this sort 
of tradition. Thus, the value of this tradition with respect to the post-mortem appearances is 
limited, even though it does imply that people at least thought Jesus was alive in some sense. 
One of the central passages concerning the resurrection appearances is found in 1 
Corinthians 15:3-8. Paul provides a list of witnesses to the Resurrection, including himself: 
For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: 
that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, 
that he was buried, 
that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, 
and that he appeared to Cephas 
 
then to the twelve. 
Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time, 
     (most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep.) 
Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. 
 
(Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me.)133 
The authenticity of Paul’s letter sent to the church at Corinth is universally recognized 
and does not require additional comments. The date of the letter and/or Paul’s time in Corinth 
can be ascertained relatively precisely. Aquila and Priscilla arrived at Corinth before Paul due to 
Claudius’ edict to expel the Jews (Acts 18:2). Based upon Orosius’ statement in Historiae contra 
 
132 Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters (New York: 
T&T Clark, 2005), 229; Theißen and Merz, Der historische Jesus, 422. 
133 1 Cor 15:3-5a; 5b-7; 15:8; emphasis and parentheses added. The reference to the passages are placed in 
the footnote to improve the readability. 
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Paganos, this event is commonly dated to AD 49, the ninth year of Claudius’ reign.134 According 
to Acts 18:11-17, Jews brought Paul before the tribunal at the time when Gallio was the 
proconsul of Achaia during Paul’s time at Corinth (cf. Acts 18:11). The inscription on the Gallio 
stone found at Delphi allows us to narrow down the date to Gallio’s proconsulship. Conzelmann 
explains that the number 26 found on the stone refers to acclamations to the emperor Claudius, 
whose 26th acclamation lies between January and August 52.135 This allows for the periods 51/52 
or 52/53. The former date is more likely, according to Conzelmann, because proconsuls entered 
office in spring and the inscription itself contains a response to a report of Gallio, which requires 
that there was sufficient time for investigation and transmission of the correspondence.136 After 
the uproar, Paul journeyed on to Ephesus from where the letter was written no later than AD 55. 
With reference to 1 Corinthians 15:3-8 the date of Paul’s visit to Corinth is more important than 
the date of composition because Paul states, “I delivered to you as of first importance what I also 
received” (1 Cor 15:3). It is generally recognized that the terms paredoka (“delivered”) and 
parelabon (“received”) are Jewish technical terms used for the transmission of tradition.137 The 
apostle is thereby referring to information that he himself received and had already passed on to 
the Corinthians during his visit sometime before AD 52. Thus, reports of resurrection 
appearances are spread in Greece already around that time. It should now be examined of what 
quality these reports were and from where Paul received the information. 
 
134 Orosius, Historiae Adversus Paganos 7.6.15f; see also Suetonius, Divus Claudius 25.4. 
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137 Leon Morris, 1 Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale New Testament commentaries 
v. 7 (Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Academic, 2008), 157; Kirk R MacGregor, “1 Corinthians 15:3b-6a,7 and the Bodily 
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There are several reasons why most scholars think that at least the material in 1 
Corinthians 15:3-5 is probably pre-Pauline. First, Paul himself indicates that he received the 
material and passed it on to the church at Corinth (cf. 1 Cor 15:3a). Second, the language is not 
typically Pauline. Kloppenborg identifies the following terms as non-Pauline: (1) hyper ton 
harmartion hemon (“for our sins”), (2) kata tas graphas (“according to the Scriptures”), (3) 
etaphe, (4) egegertai (“he has been raised”), (5) te hemera te trite (“on the third day”), (6) opthe 
(“he was seen”), and (7) hoi dodeka.138 Third, the name kepha is an Aramaic transliteration of 
Cephas for Peter and the repetitive phrase kai hoti (“and that”) is typical for Aramaic narration 
and therefore possibly indicates a Semitic origin.139 But whether the formula does in fact 
originate from an Aramaic community is disputed.140 
The discussion is more complex with respect to 1 Corinthians 5b-7, however. 
Kloppenborg summarizes several conflicting characteristics, namely that verses 5b to 8, on the 
one hand, can be attributed to Paul because of the connectives eita and epeita, but that material 
in 6a and 7 may be non-Pauline due to the usage of the terms opthe, epano, and ephapax, on the 
other hand.141 Stuhlmacher argues convincingly that verse 6b (“most of whom are still alive, 
though some have fallen asleep”) is typically Pauline.142 MacGregor agrees because the terms 
meno and koimaomai are frequently used elsewhere in the Pauline corpus.143 But, he sees in the 
 
138 John Kloppenborg, “An Analysis of the Pre-Pauline Formula 1 Cor 15: 3b-5 In Light of Some Recent 
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139 See, for instance, MacGregor, “1 Corinthians 15,” 226. 
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phrase heos arti (“still”) a hint that Paul is providing a comment on this passage.144 Interestingly, 
Moffitt finds that, when Paul’s comments in verses 6b and 8 are removed and verses 6a and 7 are 
stitched together with the formula in verses 3b to 5, several parallels emerge, including a chiastic 
pattern and a structural similarity between the last hoti and epeita clauses, since they both refer 
to either Cephas or James, followed by the designation “the twelve” or “the apostles”:145 
that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, 
and that he was buried, 
and that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, 
and that he appeared to Cephas 
then to the twelve. 
Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time,  
Then he appeared to James, 
then to all the apostles. (1 Cor 15:3b-6a, and 7; emphasis added) 
Thus, while there are clear indications that verses 3b to 5 reflect an early tradition, the 
verses 6a and 7 may also be part of it. But in the latter case the evidence is less decisive. In 
summary, then, the creed reflects awareness of appearances to the following individuals or 
groups: (1) Cephas, (3) the twelve, (4) more than 500, and (5) James, (6) the apostles. At this 
point, it should be noted that “the twelve” should not be equated with “all the apostles.” The 
latter probably encompasses a wider circle of disciples. 
This tradition goes back to very early times, probably no later than six years after the 
crucifixion. According to Paul, he spent fifteen days in Jerusalem with Peter and James (Gal 
1:18-19). Since Paul met Peter, their exchange would have ensured that their messages were in 
line with each other. Or, as Schweizer puts it, the tradition “can, at least, not contradict what 
 
144 Ibid., 228. 
145 David M. Moffitt, “Affirming the ‘Creed’: The Extent of Paul’s Citation of an Early Christian Formula 
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[Paul] has heard then.”146 It is, on the one hand, possible that Paul received the tradition during 
the time in Jerusalem. If Paul refers to his conversion experience on the road to Damascus in 
Galatians 1:18, then the visit occurred three years after his conversion. The Damascus road 
experience is normally dated to between one and three years after the crucifixion and thus the 
visit took place around four to six years after the crucifixion.147 If, on the other hand, Paul already 
received the tradition in Damascus, then he received it no later than three years after the actual 
events. Paul could, of course, also have received the tradition or parts thereof on one of his later 
visits to Jerusalem (cf. Acts 11:27-30; 15:1-29; and Gal 2:1-10). With respect to these visits, 
Licona emphasizes that the interactions with the apostles and the leadership of the church in 
Jerusalem further ensure that “we have what amounts to a certifiably official teaching of the 
disciples on the Resurrection of Jesus.”148 So, in any case, the tradition of these resurrection 
appearances is not only very early but also directly linked to or at least in line with apostolic 
testimony. 
Luke 24:34 probably constitutes a pre-Lukan formula: “saying, The Lord has risen 
indeed, and has appeared to Simon!” Prior to discussing why this appears to be the case, 
however, it should be noted that a textual problem may be associated with the passage at hand. 
Depending on whether “saying” refers to the apostles (i.e. “the eleven,” cf. Lk 24:33) or the 
Emmaus disciples, Simon may be either the apostle Peter or the companion of Cleopas. Ramelli 
argues that the readings of the Bezae Codex, as well as the ones of the Old Syriac and Coptic 
 
146 Eduard Schweizer, “Resurrection: Fact or Illusion?,” Horizons in Biblical Theology 1 (1979): 145. 
147 Habermas and Licona, Case for the Resurrection, loc. 436-437n25. 
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tradition, favor the second option and remove various interpretive difficulties.149 She 
hypothesizes that legontes may have changed to legontas.150 This assertion however does not 
seem very plausible because almost all other available manuscripts (including earlier ones) attest 
to the latter reading and the more difficult reading is normally preferred by textual critics, so the 
argument that interpretive difficulties are removed rather serves as an argument against her 
suggested reading. What is more, since Peter’s protophany is also directly mentioned in 1 
Corinthians 15:5 and possibly alluded to in Mk 16:7, as O’Collins notes, 151 it is more likely that 
the phrase also refers to the apostle Peter in this instance. 
There are various reasons why Luke 24:34 probably reflects an old tradition. First, when 
the context of the narrative in Luke 24 is followed, the phrase appears suddenly, only to 
disappear immediately afterwards again. No additional details about the appearance to Simon are 
provided in Luke nor in any of the other canonical Gospels. This is not to say that it does not 
serve any purpose in the narrative, but rather that it is not too tightly linked to the events prior 
(i.e. the appearance to the Emmaus disciples) or after (i.e. the appearance to the eleven and 
others) the locus of the passage. O’Collins suggests that Luke introduces this formula to “head 
off any impression that the Emmaus appearance is the primary one.”152 The way the verse is thus 
embedded in its context allows for the possibility that Luke is citing a formula. 
Second, another important feature is that the apostle is referred to as “Simon” and not as “Peter.” 
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Luke primarily refers to the him as Simon before narrating the appointment of the twelve 
disciples (cf. Lk 6:12-16). Afterwards, he calls him Peter, with only very few exceptions. The 
exceptions include cases in which Jesus directly addresses Peter (Lk 7:40 and Lk 22:31) and two 
verses that immediately follow a direct address (Lk 7:43; 7:44). Apart from the latter two cases, 
the apostle is always called Peter when referred to in the third person singular. It is, therefore, 
surprising that he is called Simon, even though he is referred to in the third person singular. The 
passage also differs from the other preceding exceptions because Luke 24:34 neither contains a 
direct address to Peter nor one that is placed subsequently. It is therefore not typically Lukan and 
thus likely pre-Lukan. Pesch suggests that this designation could point to a high age of the 
formula.153 But the exact age of the formula is difficult to determine. Eckstein thinks that, from a 
form-critical standpoint, this designation precedes the more honorable epithet “Kephas.”154 If this 
assessment is correct, then this pre-Lukan formula even predates the one found in 1 Corinthians 
15:3-5, since Peter is referred to as Kephas in the latter passage. But even if, contrary to 
Eckstein, the tradition cited in Luke 24:34 somehow relies on 1 Corinthians 15:5, Theißen and 
Merz stress that each of these formulas is autonomous and has its own language tradition.155 
Jesus’ appearance to the apostle Peter is thus supported by multiple, early and, most importantly, 
independent sources, since both of them exhibit their own language tradition. 
In summary, several early sources report that Jesus was seen alive after his death by both 
individuals (including Peter, James and Paul) and groups. The oral traditions attesting to these 
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events date back very early, probably within a few years after Jesus’ execution. The reliability of 
these reports is strengthened because they either directly derive from eyewitnesses or could be 
verified through them. In contrast, there is no direct testimony to the contrary, namely that these 
sightings did not occur or were invented. Consequently, it is permissible to deduce from these 
reports that appearances were not only reported but also experienced. 
Fact 3: The transformation of Saul of Tarsus 
Saul of Tarsus plays a crucial role in examining what happened after Jesus’ death. As 
discussed above, he was acquainted with at least some of the other apostles and others who 
claimed to have seen the risen Christ. Moreover, we find the earliest eyewitness reports of the 
appearances in his writings. Prior to his conversion, however, Saul (hereafter Paul) was a zealous 
Pharisee who persecuted the church. It was due to what he believed to be an encounter with the 
risen Jesus that he became a Christian, as nearly all scholars who research this subject concede.156 
Paul was a devout Jew and committed to the Jewish way of living (Phil 3:5). According 
to Luke, he was born in Tarsus (Acts 22:3), a city in Asia Minor known for its philosophical and 
rhetorical schools.157 Brown lists several reasons for why the majority of scholars think that Paul 
was not only born but also educated there, including (1) his skill in Greek, (2) his rhetorical 
abilities, (3) Greek quotations from Scripture, and (4) his acquaintance with Deuterocanonical 
books in Greek.158 The claim that Paul was educated by Gamaliel (cf. Acts 22:3) is disputed. It is 
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noteworthy, however, that Chilton and Neusner identify affinities between the teachings of Paul 
and Gamaliel.159 Although this would support the biblical testimony, this evidence does not 
necessarily show that they were in direct contact with each other. But, irrespective of whether 
Paul was taught in Jerusalem and/or Tarsus, Paul did exhibit good scholarly credentials. 
The apostle Paul repeatedly admits in his undisputed letters that he persecuted the church. 
He sees himself unworthy even to be called an apostle because he “persecuted the church of 
God” (1 Cor 15:9). Elsewhere, he also explains that he violently persecuted Christians in his 
attempt to destroy the church (Gal 1:13). Paul’s persecution of the early Christian church is also 
numerously attested in Acts (cf. Acts 7:58; 8:1.3; 22:4-5; and 26:9-11). Thus, Paul’s hostility 
towards the church is multiply attested. This is not to say that each of these sources are usually 
seen as equally reliable. The reliability of Acts hinges on whether Luke wrote Acts and was a 
companion of Paul. Nevertheless, even within the Pauline corpus itself, it is attested several 
times and supported by the oral testimony that was passed on to the churches in Judea (Gal 1:22-
23). If it is correct that Paul met Peter and James between four and six years after the crucifixion, 
as discussed above, then the oral testimony would probably have originated from the Judean 
churches before that, at the time when Paul was still an enemy of the church. 
The claim that Paul formerly persecuted the church is also strengthened because it meets 
the principle of embarrassment. It is difficult to think of reasons for why Paul would falsely 
make such an assertion such that it outweighs the disadvantages of making such an embarrassing 
confession. Moreover, according to Acts 9:26-27, Paul encountered difficulties when attempting 
to join the church in Jerusalem because these Christians did not trust him. Since Paul’s former 
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persecution was even a hindrance to his efforts within the church, the accuracy of this confession 
is thus further substantiated. 
Concerning the question as to why Paul changed his mind and became a follower of 
Christ further elaboration is needed. Paul refers to the personal appearance of Jesus in 1 
Corinthians 9:1 and 15:8. While the first passage refers to Paul’s sighting of Jesus (“Have I not 
seen Jesus our Lord?”), the latter one speaks about Jesus’ appearance to Paul (“he appeared also 
to me”). Even though both passages do not provide any additional details about where and when 
this experience occurred, they do stress that Paul believed that he had a personal encounter with 
Jesus. This event is referred to in more detail in Galatians 1:11-19, as most scholars think that 
Paul here refers to his conversion experience on the road to Damascus:160 
For I would have you know, brothers, that the gospel that was preached by me is not 
man’s gospel. For I did not receive it from any man, nor was I taught it, but I received it 
through a revelation of Jesus Christ. For you have heard of my former life in Judaism, 
how I persecuted the church of God violently and tried to destroy it. And I was advancing 
in Judaism beyond many of my own age among my people, so extremely zealous was I 
for the traditions of my fathers. But when he who had set me apart before I was born, and 
who called me by his grace, was pleased to reveal his Son to me, in order that I might 
preach him among the Gentiles, I did not immediately consult with anyone; nor did I go 
up to Jerusalem to those who were apostles before me, but I went away into Arabia, and 
returned again to Damascus. Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to visit Cephas 
and remained with him fifteen days. But I saw none of the other apostles except James 
the Lord’s brother. 
In this passage, Paul explains that due to a revelation (apokalypsis) of some sort, his life 
was changed in such a manner that he stopped persecuting the church and started to proclaim the 
very message he once sought to destroy. Concerning the persecution, Moo notes that Paul 
stresses the intensity of his former persecution, particularly in Galatians 1:13.161 Paul introduces 
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the effect the experience had on him in Galatians 1:16, where he states that the Son was revealed 
in him “in order that [he] might preach him among the Gentiles,” which serves to support his 
apostolic call, according to Schreiner.162 Therefore, Paul’s transformation from a persecutor to an 
apostle due to what he believed to be an encounter with the risen Christ can be solely established 
based on the evidence from the Pauline corpus itself. 
There is a disagreement, however, as to what sort of appearance Paul is referring to. The 
beginning of verse 16 can also be rendered “to reveal his son in me” (Gal 1:16a, NIV). Some 
commentators argue that Paul is thinking of a hallucinatory or visionary experience in this case, 
whereas others think that the passage does not require such an interpretation and should be 
weighed against Paul’s other remarks concerning the Resurrection, where he seems to imply a 
bodily view of the Resurrection. The latter view seems more convincing because the text can 
also be rendered “to me” instead of “in me,” 163 and the root word apokalypsis can denote “to 
reveal, to disclose, to make fully known” in this context, according to Louw and Nida.164 
Moreover, elsewhere Paul employs the term to refer to a physical “revealing of the sons of God” 
(Rom 8:19).165 In any case, the term need not necessarily refer to either a hallucinatory or 
visionary appearance. But, due to the selected methodology in approaching the question about 
Jesus’ Resurrection, it is important that a distinction is made at this point between the historical 
facts that are accepted by most scholars and the hypotheses which are based upon these facts. For 
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this reason, the question concerning the type of appearance needs to be relegated until the 
hypotheses themselves are examined. So far, it shall suffice to point out that the discussed 
passages do not preclude any sort of appearance that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Paul’s conversion experience is narrated in more detail in Acts 9:1-19; 22:6-16; and 
26:12-18. Even though a good case can be made for the reliability of Acts,166 since not nearly all 
scholars agree that Luke, a travelling companion of Paul, wrote Acts,167 those passages cannot be 
given too much weight with respect to their details in the present investigation. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that these three passages not only agree amongst each other concerning several 
core features, namely (1) Paul’s persecution of Christians, (2) Paul encountered Jesus, and (3) 
that his life was changed due to this event such that he became a Christian missionary, as Allison 
points out,168 but they also agree with Paul’s own testimony in his letters as already discussed 
above. The main aspects of Paul’s transformation are thus attested by multiple sources. 
Moreover, the conversion experience is corroborated in Acts 9:3-8 and Galatians 1:11-18. In the 
letter to the Galatians, McGrew observes, Paul’s first visit to Damascus is implied because it 
states he “returned again [emphasis added] to Damascus” (Gal 1:17).169 Because of this 
implication, it corroborates the narrative in Acts which confirms that Paul went to Damascus 
after his conversion, although the place Damascus is mentioned sequentially after Arabia in 
Galatians. It is unlikely to be the case that the author of Acts invented the first visit to Damascus 
 
166 See, for instance, Hemer, Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History. 
167 Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 382n361; Licona mentions that the estimate was provided by Craig 
Keener. 
168 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 263 The items two to six in Allison’s list are subsumed in the second point 
above because they all relate to Paul’s encounter with Jesus. 
169 McGrew, Hidden in Plain View, loc. 1951. 
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such that it corroborates the passage found in Galatians. This cumulatively substantiates the 
approximate geographical location of his conversion experience. 
Paul’s commitment to following Christ and proclaiming the gospel resulted for him also 
in persecution and suffering. There are various passages in his undisputed letters in which he 
refers to multiple occasions on which he experienced adversity. One such passage is 2 
Corinthians 11:23-27, where Paul reports that he was imprisoned, flogged, beaten and stoned. 
Even an extra-biblical source exists. 1 Clement was written approximately thirty years after 
Paul’s death and confirms some of Paul’s sufferings for the Christian faith. The following 
passage refers to several ways in which he suffered, including jealousy and strife, imprisonment, 
exile and stoning: 
Because of jealousy and strife Paul pointed the way to the prize for endurance. Seven 
times he bore chains; he was sent into exile and stoned; he served as a herald in both the 
East and the West; and he received the noble reputation for his faith. He taught 
righteousness to the whole world, and came to the limits of the West, bearing his witness 
before the rulers. And so, he was set free from this world and transported up to the holy 
place, having become the greatest example of endurance.170 
 
Concerning the text that directly precedes the passage cited above, Ehrman notes Paul is 
referred to as one of the pillars who was persecuted “even to death.”171 Ehrman’s assessment that 
Paul is included amongst those pillars is probably correct because Paul is mentioned almost 
immediately after this reference, only second to Peter, whose sufferings are also briefly referred 
to.172 But the data in support of Paul’s martyrdom is not sufficiently strong and not accepted by 
 
170 1 Clement 5.5-7. 
171 Bart D. Ehrman, Peter, Paul and Mary Magdalene: The Followers of Jesus in History and Legend 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 173. Ehrman does not state explicitly which passage he means. It is 
probably 1 Clement 5.2, since it is there where the term “even to death” occurs in conjunction with martyrdom. 
172 1 Clement 5.4. 
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the majority of scholars, so as to be counted a minimal fact. In contrast, however, the references 
to Paul’s sufferings are multiply attested and can, therefore, be adduced in this case. 
To summarize, even though certain details concerning Paul’s conversion experience, 
particularly the ones in Acts, and the type of appearance are not part of the first-order facts, the 
general sequence of events that led to Paul’s transformation from persecuting to promoting the 
church in the face of persecution can be firmly established on historical grounds. Moreover, 
although there is no general agreement over the kind of experience that led to Paul’s conversion, 
the sources indicate that Paul believed that he saw the risen Jesus near Damascus. 
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Chapter 3 – Evaluation of the Hypotheses 
 
Based on the previous chapter, several historical facts concerning Jesus’ death and what 
happened thereafter could be established. These facts include (1) Jesus’ death by crucifixion, (2) 
the resurrection appearances thereafter, and (3) the transformed life of the apostle Paul. As 
indicated in chapter 1, the conditional probabilities of these facts given the competing 
hypotheses (𝑃(𝑒1│ℎ𝑗 , 𝑘)), as well as the prior probabilities of the hypotheses (𝑃(ℎ𝑗|𝑘)), now 
need to be estimated, so as to allow for a comparison between the likelihood of these hypotheses. 
In this section, only those hypotheses are considered that are given greater emphasis and 
generally regarded as more plausible in recent academic literature. These include the subjective 
vision, objective vision, and the resurrection hypothesis. Notwithstanding, several of the omitted 
hypotheses should briefly be mentioned. 
First, the swoon hypothesis (i.e. that Jesus survived the crucifixion) is not discussed 
because it does not fit the first fact and is seldomly advocated by specialists ever since Strauss’ 
devastating critique: 
It is impossible that a being who had been stolen half-dead out of the sepulchre, who 
crept about weak and ill, wanting medical treatment, who required bandaging, 
strengthening, and indulgence, and who still at last yielded to his sufferings, could have 
given to the disciples the impression that he was a Conqueror over death and the grave, 
the Prince of Life, an impression which lay at the bottom of their future ministry. Such a 
resuscitation could only have weakened the impression he had made upon them in life 
and in death, at the most could only have given it an elegiac voice, but could by no 
possibility have changed their sorrow into enthusiasm, have elevated their reverence into 
worship.173 
Second, the legend hypothesis which claims in its most radical form that Jesus never 
existed or in a somewhat less extreme form that the aforementioned facts cannot be established 
 
173 David Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1879), 412. 
63 
with a sufficient degree of certainty.174 It is not addressed because it essentially constitutes an 
attempt to undermine these very facts. If the analysis in the preceding chapter is accurate, the 
legend hypothesis is no plausible candidate because it does not explain these facts. For this 
reason, it is also useless to estimate the conditional probabilities of facts which are denied by that 
hypothesis. 
Third, the fraud hypothesis indeed explains the fact that Jesus was crucified, assumes 
however that people falsely asserted that there were appearances because they either lied or they 
were misled by others into thinking so.175 The hypothesis does, therefore, not agree that Jesus 
appeared to the disciples and, hence, fails to account for the second fact. Moreover, unless it is 
assumed that the apostle Paul was somehow involved in the supposed conspiracy, it needs to be 
combined with an additional hypothesis to explain the conversion of the apostle to Christianity. 
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Subjective Vision Hypothesis 
According to the subjective vision hypothesis (SVH), the disciples experienced visions or 
hallucinations in which Jesus appeared as the risen Christ while they were grieving after Jesus’ 
death. Saul of Tarsus presumably converted to Christianity because Jesus appeared to him on the 
road to Damascus. In this view, the sensory experiences of an object that is seen are a mere 
product of the mind. Thus, the object cannot be said to exist outside of or apart from the 
observer. More precisely, Davis defines it as a sort of vision that occurs when “someone 
sincerely claims to see something, no one else can see it, and the reason that no one else can see 
it is because the item purportedly seen is not real, is not objectively there to be seen.”176 
Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) 
When examining the first factor, one of the main concerns lies in assessing the 
relationship between subjective visions and sudden death. It is not intuitive to estimate the 
probability that Jesus died by crucifixion given that several people experienced subjective 
visions afterwards (𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻)) because the causal relation is more likely to run in the other 
direction due to the perceived sequential order of the events. Fortunately, the likelihood can also 
be computed indirectly by estimating it in the other direction, that is the probability of people 
experiencing visions given that someone else died (𝑝(𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻|𝐹1)). But caution is warranted 
because Bayes’ theorem informs us that the two likelihoods differ unless 𝑝(𝐹1) equals 
 
176 Stephen T Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins, The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary 
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𝑝(𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻).177 Notwithstanding, estimating 𝑝(𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻|𝐹1) provides a good starting point for 
examining this hypothesis. The higher the likelihood that people experience subjective visions 
upon the death of a person they knew, the more plausible the hypothesis. 
To argue in favor of the SVH, it needs to be shown that there is a relationship between 
visions occurring subsequently to the death of a close relative or friend. Lüdemann, for instance, 
appeals to psychological research in support of the notion that people may experience such 
visions as they mourn the death of a beloved person. He cites a study of Parkes and Weiss in 
which they identify three factors that hinder widows in their bereavement process, namely (1) 
sudden death, (2) conflicting feelings towards the person who died, and (3) a dependent 
relationship.178 Lüdemann then argues that these factors apply in Peter’s case.179 He then 
concludes that such a psychotic disorder led to Peter’s “self-deception.”180 
The difficulties entailed by historical psychological analyses has been discussed 
repeatedly. Based on a comprehensive survey of existing literature on the subject, Anderson lists 
six difficulties entailed by such an analysis.181 Even though he suggests methodological 
improvements in an attempt to overcome these difficulties, Anderson warns of inflated 
 
177 Recall that using Bayes’ theorem the likelihood can be computed as follows: 𝑃(𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻|𝐹1) =
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expectations and clarifies that “the psychobiographer's explanations should be recognized as 
speculative.”182 But even if such an analysis were feasible, it is still questionable whether the 
likelihood of bereavement hallucinations (BH) are sufficiently high in the case of any of the 
disciples. Therefore, a closer look at Peter, who seems to be the most likely candidate for 
experiencing a BH, is in order. 
First, the three factors identified by Parkes and Weiss are based on a study of widows and 
need not apply to the relationship between Peter and Jesus. BHs are more common in the case of 
widows. As Kamp et al. summarize, studies report that between 40% to 70% of cases of BHs are 
due to widowhood.183 Additionally, they note that the length of the marriage significantly affects 
the likelihood of BHs.184 Unfortunately, it is a relatively common statistical mistake that such 
findings are applied to Peter. Applying a false reference class (in this case “widow” instead of 
“close friend”) to Peter results in using a too high base rate and, hence, leads to an 
overestimation of the SVH’s probability.185 In their meta-study, Castelnovo et al. analyze studies 
in which the prevalence is not limited to widows but also encompasses the general public. They 
observe that rates found in these studies vary between 10% and 41%.186 But the upper bound can 
 
182 Ibid., 461. 
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be misleading, since the study of Kalish and Reynolds which reports the highest value of up to 
41% is not limited to hallucinations but also includes dreams and felt presences.187 Moreover, the 
second-highest value of 25% reported by Greeley also adds felt presences.188 Hence, if the studies 
are limited to those that only report BHs, the value is more likely to lie between 10%-17%, 
which is significantly lower than in the case of widows only. In fact, the relevant probability in 
Peter’s case can be assumed to be even lower, as Castelnovo et al. observe, “little is known about 
grief hallucinations in cases where the deceased is not a spouse but a son, a relative or close 
friend, which mainly consist in sporadic case reports.”189 Such a low probability renders the 
hypothesis that Peter saw Jesus in a vision less than improbable. 
Next, it is reductionistic to limit the psychological analysis to correlating three factors 
with Peter. In fact, it seems unlikely that Peter’s experience was a BH, once additional factors 
that increase the likelihood of BHs are also discussed. For instance, Kamp et al. find that an 
avoidant and detached coping style and openness to new experiences are significant explanatory 
variables for BHs,190 none of which seem to apply in Peter’s case. Because many of these factors 
do not apply to Peter, the probability can be lowered to very improbable. 
Additional qualifications need to be made concerning the aforementioned remarks. It 
would be fallacious to assume that “people are intellectually and psychologically the same in all 
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times, places, and circumstances,”191 as Fisher notes. Since the frequency of such experiences 
need not be identical in the first century and today, it is crucial to not only consider how probable 
these sorts of subjective experiences are today. Casey claims that they were more prevalent than 
today,192 stating that the “Second Temple Judaism was a visionary culture, in which people 
believed that people saw appearances of God and angels, and had visions and dreams in which 
God and angels appeared to them.”193 Thus, the likelihood of experiencing BHs may be higher 
after all, due to differences in the historical context. That Peter experienced a vision (ekstasis), 
though not a bereavement hallucination, is acknowledged in Acts 10:10-16. Louw and Nida 
define the Greek term used in this passage as “vision accompanied by an ecstatic psychological 
state.”194 This is not to say, however, that the vision described in Acts 10 does not constitute or 
entail a message communicated to him by God. In any case, even though Peter does not appear 
to be particularly prone to BHs, the likelihood that he experienced a vision after Jesus’ death 
needs to be adjusted upwards because he also experienced a vision in a different situation. 
Considering the previous aspects of the discussion, I adjust 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) from very improbable to 
even odds. 
Finally, the mode of execution also affects the likelihood of 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻). Several 
scholars point out that Jews generally thought of crucified people as being cursed by God (cf. 
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Deut 21:22-23).195 It seems ceteris paribus more likely that a disciple would experience a vision 
in which Jesus appears to be raised from the dead, if Jesus would not have been crucified. In 
other words, the fact that Jesus was crucified, decreases the likelihood that Jesus would be 
regarded as victorious. A person crucified and, therefore, cursed by God would have been 
regarded as a looser not a winner. Moreover, even if the disciples would have thought that he 
was raised, it is improbable that a pious Jew like Peter or Paul would have continued to maintain 
the wishful thoughts that were so contrary to the Mosaic view that the crucifixion victim was 
cursed. Hence, it is slightly improbable that the disciples would have had a subjective vision in 
which they saw the risen Jesus, given that Jesus was crucified and seemingly under a curse. 
Taking into account the various aspects that affect 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻), including (1) the 
possibility of BHs after someone died, (2) the somewhat higher prevalence of hallucinations in 
first-century Palestine in comparison to today, (3) Peter’s visionary experience described in Acts 
10, and (4) the tension between curse due to crucifixion and vindication, I estimate that 
𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) is slightly improbable (40%). 
Fact 2: 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) 
The second factor involves an assessment of how likely it is that people report seeing 
appearances, given the SVH. At first glance, it seems plausible that the SVH can account for the 
appearances because subjective visions entail appearances. When a person experiences a 
(subjective) vision, that person may think that he or she sees another person. Manford and 
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Andermann explain these sorts of visual hallucinations (i.e. a particular type of subjective 
visions) as follows: 
The content of the hallucinations is dramatic; they are usually in vivid colours and may 
evolve from simple spots of light through geometric patterns to complex images, or they 
may be complex from the outset. Sufferers often see human figures or faces (sometimes 
torsos without heads or vice versa); animals (real or bizarre), sometimes in miniature 
(Lilliputian hallucinations) or scenery of outstanding beauty.196 
 
Since the disciples claimed that they saw a human figure (i.e. Jesus) alive after the 
crucifixion, it is initially probable that they would claim that Jesus appeared to them, given the 
SVH. But additional factors need to be considered.  
It is evident from the discussion of fact two that after Jesus’ death people claimed that He 
was alive because they saw Him. The claim of the passages in which the appearances are 
reported (cf. Lk 24:34 and 1 Cor 15:4) entails that Jesus is (somehow) alive because He is risen. 
Hence, the value 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) also pertains to the likelihood that people report and sincerely 
believe that Jesus is alive, given that they experience hallucinations. This depends on the cultural 
background of that time. 
There appears to be a strong tradition in Greco-Roman culture that speaks of the finality 
of death. Aeschylus, for instance, clearly states that there is no resurrection and that dead people 
cannot be called back from Hades.197 This was, according to Wright, the general attitude amongst 
the ancients.198 In first-century Judaism, on the other hand, there was either no belief in an 
afterlife or a belief in a general resurrection at the end of times. Vermès concludes his discussion 
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of how prevalent the belief in a resurrection was in first-century Jewish society, stating, “the 
notion of bodily resurrection propagated by the Pharisees was alien to first-century Hellenistic 
Jews, and was on the whole unfamiliar in most layers of Palestinian Jewry.”199 Understandably, 
therefore, Wright, remarks that “such visions meant precisely, as people in the ancient and 
modern worlds have discovered, that the person was dead, not that they were alive.”200 
There are, however, examples to the contrary which at minimum allude to the possibility 
of a reversal of death. In this regard, after discussing examples of mythical antiquity (Orpheus 
and Eurydice, Aesclepius, Alcestis, and Protesilaus), Bryan finds that according to some stories, 
“however  difficult or unlikely such reversal might be, it could happen if the conditions were 
right, and occasionally even had happened.”201 These few examples do not offset the general 
attitude concerning the finality of death, which increases the probability that people would have 
remained convicted that Jesus was dead, even though He had appeared to them. Nevertheless, 
Bryan’s examples do show that it may have been considered at least possible by some people 
that Jesus was alive again after having died. Thus, even though it is possible that the disciples 
saw Jesus in a SV, it is unlikely the disciples would have believed that Jesus was alive. 
Another important question to consider is whether people in the first century were able to 
distinguish between different kinds of appearances, namely subjective and objective ones, as 
well as corporeal and non-corporeal ones. This can be referred to as the distinguishability factor. 
Oberdorfer speaks of how the SVH requires that the disciples “objectified” a spiritual vision into 
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corporeal revivification.202 The SVH is more likely, if they were unable to distinguish between 
these categories. According to Greek thinking, dead people remain dead. The Greek historian 
Herodotus (ca. 484-425 BC), describes how a man named Aristeas was seen alive after his death, 
but Herodotus consistently assumes that the man remained dead.203 Moreover, he reports that the 
appearance was understood by the people living in that area as a vision.204 Thus, people at that 
time were evidently able to categorize experiences as such. 
In Paul’s case, coming from a Pharisaic tradition, his thinking would have differed from 
that of Herodotus. But even though Paul maintained that there would be a physical resurrection 
in the future, like the Pharisees of his day, he was also acquainted with visionary experiences (2 
Cor 12:2-4). Two remarks are in order concerning these experiences. First, they need not 
necessarily be subjective visions and thus reduced to mere psychological phenomena. To 
presuppose that they were SVs, is to beg the question. In fact, they seem to differ from SVs, 
because according to Paul there is some objective component to these experiences (2 Cor 12:3). 
But this shall be discussed in more detail below, since it is directly relevant to fact three. Second, 
even if those experiences could be reduced to SVs, it does not follow that Jesus’ appearance to 
Paul was also a SV, since Paul clearly differentiates between the two.205 
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The claims of the early church, however, are not only limited to appearances, but also 
include the assertion that “the Lord has risen” (Lk 24:34). Even though appearances are probable 
in the OVH, it is questionable whether a non-physical appearance explains why the disciples 
came to be convinced that God had actually raised Jesus from the dead. Craig argues that a non-
physical appearance only helps insofar that the disciples would have arrived at the belief that 
Jesus was assumed into heaven (as in the cases of Enoch and Elijah), but not that he was 
raised.206 Indeed, given the Jewish beliefs about the afterlife, it seems more likely that SVs would 
have originated from their minds with a content other than a bodily resurrection (prior to the last 
day). It seems considerably more probable that they would have had projected visions of Jesus in 
paradise (Lk 23:43) or Abraham’s bosom (Lk 16:22, RSV). In short, the setting of Jesus’ 
appearances in this world rather than in the afterworld would be quite unexpected. 
Initially, 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) seems very probable because subjective visions entail appearances. 
Since people living in the first century, however, were (1) aware that dead people remain dead, 
(2) able to distinguish between subjective and objective appearances, and (3) more likely to 
experience a vision of Jesus in the afterworld, the factor 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) should be lowered to even 
odds (50%). 
Fact 3: 𝑝(𝐹3 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) 
Sometime after Jesus’ crucifixion, Saul of Tarsus encountered Jesus in a way that 
transformed his life. Thus, the first question to consider is how probable it is that a SV can have 
such a transformational effect in the first place. Or, in other words, how likely is it that someone 
becomes an adherent and promoter of what he perceived to be a dangerous sect as a result of a 
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SV. The second question, when considering the transformation of Paul’s life, is whether a SV 
can have a long-term effect on how he would live the rest of his life. 
As shall be seen shortly, Paul’s medical condition plays a key role in making such a case. 
It can be argued that Paul suffered from an eye disease. Landsborough derives from Paul’s 
statements in Galatians 4:15 and Galatians 6:11 that Paul had a “poor visual acuity.”207 
Landsborough is thereby attempting to identify Paul’s medical conditions based on certain clues 
from the text, which is akin to a psychological analysis of Paul and therefore may be dubious. 
But because medical conditions can be associated with outward symptoms, a medical diagnosis 
based on historical records can be more plausible than a psychological one. In any case, even if 
Landsborough is correct, the kinds of visions that are more likely to occur in conjunction with an 
ocular pathology need to be considered in Paul’s case. 
In one of the largest studies on hallucinations occurring among visually handicapped (and 
elderly) patients, Teunisse et al. detect a prevalence of 12% (63 of 505).208 The phenomenon they 
observe is referred to as Charles Bonnet’s syndrome (CBS) and can be defined as a “presence of 
complex visual hallucinations in psychologically normal people.”209 Teunisse et al. also examine 
how often CBS patients perceive the unreal nature of the hallucinations. They find that 82% of 
the patients were immediately aware that the hallucinations were illusory, while the remaining 
18%, although being deceived at first, became aware of the unreal nature after some time.210 In 
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other words, they do not find a single CBS patient who remained deluded concerning the 
hallucination over a longer period of time. If Paul was subject to the CBS but would otherwise 
have been a normal and healthy person, and if people living in the first century were equally 
likely to perceive the unreal nature of such hallucinations as today, then it is likely that Paul 
would have realized either immediately or after some time that his experience did not correspond 
to reality. 
There are, of course, visual hallucinations that may occur as a result of other diseases. 
But for all these it is even more difficult to show that the corresponding symptoms apply to Paul 
due to the scarcity of data. Nonetheless, it should still briefly be considered whether another 
disease can bring about a visual hallucination that would ensure a long-term change of Paul’s 
behavior. The potential candidates include hypnagogic and peduncular hallucinations, 
Parkinson’s disease and Lewy body dementia, migraine coma, delirium tremens and focal 
epilepsy. Manford and Andermann report cases in which patients perceive the unreal nature of 
the hallucination for peduncular hallucinations,211 Parkinson’s disease,212 and migraine coma213. In 
case of delirium tremens, a pathology that is more common among chronic alcoholics, there are 
some instances in which patients believe in the reality of what they see, although usually only at 
earlier stages.214 But delirium tremens can be dismissed as an explanation, since it is unlikely that 
Paul had undergone an exceedingly high alcohol intake prior to seeing Jesus on the road to 
Damascus. Finally, visual hallucinations due to focal epilepsy, on the other hand, are rare, can be 
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interpreted as dreams when experienced during sleep, and the figure therein seen can rarely be 
identified.215 Some religious experiences such as the awareness of the presence of a great or evil 
figure are more often observed among religious patients with temporal lobe epilepsy, a common 
type of focal epilepsy.216 But it hardly seems to apply in Paul’s case. Thus, the thesis that Paul 
was an epileptic “has fallen on hard times,” as Allison notes.217 
In summary, while there are many examples of people who recognize that the things 
which they saw in their hallucination are not real, I was unable to find any documented case for 
the aforementioned diseases in which people continually maintained over a long period of time 
that what they saw was real. Consequently, it seems unlikely that Paul would remain a Christian 
disciple for a long period of time and persist believing in the reality of a risen Christ, if he was 
dealing with a SV. 
The previous discussion of potential causes for a SV shows that they are incapable of 
affecting the (long-term) behavior of the person experiencing such a vision. However, it is often 
observed that Paul experienced religious visions and it can be argued that they had effects on his 
behavior too. According to Acts 16:9, for instance, Paul decided to travel from Troas to 
Macedonia because a man told him in a vision that he should go and preach the gospel there. But 
since SVs do not possess such transformational power, it is unlikely that such a vision was 
merely subjective. It seems that the real cause that can bring about such transformational effects 
has been overlooked and that there must be another qualitative difference, perhaps an objective 
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component to it. This is explored when considering the objective vision hypothesis. Moreover, in 
any case a theistic explanation may apply. God could have actively brought about such a 
transformation. This result also shows that a SV also may unlikely be the correct cause when 
examining contemporary religious conversions such as the one of Sadhu Sundar Singh, a twenty-
first century Hindu who opposed and killed Christians until Jesus appeared to him in a vision.218 
Because it is improbable that Paul would convert to Christianity as a result of a SV, and 
since it is extremely unlikely that he remains convinced of the reality of the content of the vision, 
I find it very improbable (5%) that Paul turned away from persecuting Christians and became a 
follower of Christ, given the SVH. 
Prior Probability: 𝑝(𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻|𝑘) 
When considering the prior probability of the SVH, it needs to be considered how 
common subjective visionary experiences were in the first century. Next, when assessing the 
likelihood of the mind producing the particular content of the supposed vision, the Jewish 
background of the earliest disciples needs to be taken into account. Moreover, since the 
hypothesis posits that multiple people shared the same or similar experiences (i.e. they believed 
that Jesus was raised from the dead), it should be considered how common such phenomena 
occur in group settings given SVs. 
It is nearly impossible to provide an accurate estimate of how prevalent visionary 
experiences were in first century Palestine. Nevertheless, an educated guess needs to be made to 
assess the prior probability. As mentioned above, contemporary studies record a prevalence of 
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somewhere around 10-17%. It may be that such visions were more common, possibly because 
they were more accepted and thus the 10-17% are underreported. But it is difficult to say how 
much more common. Numerous reports of conversion dreams, epiphanies and visions are 
scattered in ancient literature. Herman mentions an apparition found in 2 Macc. 3:24-36 
involving Heliodorus, the chief minister of king Seleucus IV Philipator and his companions,219 
several ones of Zeus Sabazius (prior to 135 BC),220 and one of Zeus Panamaros (around 40 BC in 
Asia Minor).221 Casey intends to add biblical examples to the list such as God’s appearance to 
Abram (Gen 12:7), Isaiah (Isa 6:1), Daniel (Dan 8:1;15), and Ezekiel (Ezek 1:26;28).222 Yet it 
needs to be pointed out again that none of the biblical examples need to be equated or reduced to 
mere SVs. The same applies to the apostles Peter (Mk 9:2-8; and Acts 11:5) and Paul (Acts 9:3-
8; 22:6-11; 26:12-18; and 2 Cor 12:1). Since it is impossible to compute a sufficiently accurate 
value due to the scarcity of the data, the probability can be adjusted from improbable (based on 
contemporary numbers) to slightly improbable, if we assume that the number underestimates the 
prevalence of such experiences. 
Another important aspect relates to the Jewish expectations about the future or more 
specifically the end of times. These expectations affect the probability of hallucinations and 
consequently also the probability of the SVH. Hempelmann states that the religious context of 
the disciples would not have made them expect a resurrection of an individual, as the prevalent 
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conception was rather that there would be a general resurrection at the end of times.223 This 
expectation was increasingly prevalent in the first century and can be seen, for instance, in 2 
Maccabees 7:9, 1 Enoch 62.13– 15, or Josephus. 224 After discussing various views in post-
biblical Judaism, Wright concludes that “nobody imagined that any individuals had already been 
raised, or would be raised in advance of the great last day.”225 This cultural predisposition is 
important. As Herman notes, “the content of visions, like the content of dreams, is culture 
specific; people are culturally predisposed to behold certain visions more than others.”226 Since 
the claim that Jesus alone was raised from the dead does not conform to these expectations, it is 
unlikely to be hallucinatory, Craig concludes.227 O’Connell likewise agrees that “people do 
hallucinate in accordance with expectation,” since the content of the hallucination must be 
contained in the mind, as it is a product thereof.228 Consequently, this lowers the prior probability 
of the SVH. 
The Jews who expected a future resurrection believed in the physicality of the 
resurrection body, including the Hillelites and the Shammaites.229 This, on the one hand, renders 
it more likely that those who “saw” Jesus would have believed that he had a body. On the other 
hand, it makes it more likely that they would have recognized that there was a mismatch between 
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what they thought they saw and what they actually saw. The second factor is already considered 
above in relation to fact two. But the first factor raises the prior probability that they would see 
Jesus in bodily form, since such visions entail what is already contained in the mind. With 
respect to the degree to which the aspect of the physicality of the resurrection increases the prior 
probability, it seems that the negative effect of the Jewish expectation of the resurrection at the 
end of time is not overridden. If no one expected a premature resurrection in the first place, then 
the nature of the resurrection does not matter as much. 
As mentioned above, the evidence in favor of the claim that Jesus appeared to groups in 
various settings is strong. Bergeron and Habermas note that psychiatric explanations (such as the 
SVH) for the resurrection appearances cannot be found in medical literature for the time period 
between 1918 and 2012.230 They add that “simultaneous identical collective hallucinations are not 
found in peer-reviewed medical literature.”231 This does not mean that the SVH is virtually 
impossible, but it may indicate that it is at odds with medical knowledge and thus improbable. It 
may be premature though to dismiss the SVH by merely pointing out that hallucinations are not 
group phenomena. O’Connell refutes this claim by listing over fifteen well-documented modern 
cases of subjective visions experienced by religious groups. 232 Consequently, it is not warranted 
that the prior probability of the SVH is zero on the basis of claiming that group visions do not 
occur. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the content of the vision experienced by the 
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group members differs demonstrably in several of the cases mentioned by O’Connell, 233 as he 
himself agrees.234 Moreover, Breitenbach argues that none of the group appearances of Jesus 
matches the qualities of the ones mentioned by O’Connell.235 Therefore, the fact that subjective 
visions are private experiences renders it very improbable that two or more people experience the 
same content in the vision. 
Since (1) visionary experiences were not uncommon, but (2) due to the unexpected 
timing of the appearances (viz. a resurrection prior to the end of times) and because the SVH 
maintains that (3) such experiences occur in group settings the prior probability is improbable 
(20%).  
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Objective Vision Hypothesis 
In comparison to the other two hypotheses that are discussed in this chapter, the objective 
vision hypothesis is more difficult to define. Davis defines it as follows: 
An objective vision [is] a situation where someone sincerely claims to see something, no 
one else can see it, and the reason that no one else can see it is because it is not the sort of 
thing that can be seen by normal vision. That is, the person who has the objective vision 
has been enabled by God to see the real and objective presence of the thing; the see-er 
has an ability to see it that others lack.236 
Similarly, Grass emphasizes that the thing being seen in an objective vision is not accessible to 
everyone.237 The hypothesis requires that what is seen in the vision cannot be seen by those who 
are not enabled (by God) to do so. Hence, even though the OVH entails a literal viewing of some 
kind, Jesus could not have been seen by others because the hypothesis assumes that it was a 
noncorporeal seeing. 
It is noteworthy that the definition above entails a supernatural element, namely that it is 
God who enables a person to experience a particular vision. Habermas states that the hypothesis 
is “an appeal beyond nature,”238 and can thus be classified as a supernatural internal hypothesis 
concerning Jesus’ Resurrection.239 This impacts the evaluation of the hypothesis because the 
probability of God’s existence affects the prior probability as in case of the RH. Given this 
supernatural element and the fact that the likelihood of God’s existence is accounted for in the 
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prior probability, there is no longer a reason why theological considerations should not be taken 
into account when estimating the conditional probabilities below. 
Since the OVH resembles both the SVH as well as the RH in some respects, the 
arguments that apply to the OVH and the SVH are considered to estimate the corresponding 
probabilities. But they need not be reiterated here in detail. Where such estimates are applicable, 
the reader is referred to the corresponding sections. 
Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) 
The OVH posits a different causal order of the visions and the Resurrection belief. Grass 
argues that it is, in contrast to the SVH, not the belief that resulted in the visions, but the visions 
that caused the faith in the Resurrection.240 Whereas the appearances are seen as part of the 
bereavement process in the aftermath of Jesus’ death on account of the SVH, the OVH posits a 
different reason for the appearances and the disciples’ faith. From the latter perspective, it can be 
argued that Jesus’ death requires a Resurrection involving appearances to the disciples, which 
then resulted in their belief that Jesus was raised. If this line of reasoning is correct, it lends 
credibility to the claim that the OVH is positively related to Jesus’ death. 
As pointed out earlier (cf. “Subjective Vision Hypothesis”), crucifixion victims were 
regarded as cursed by God in Jewish society (cf. Deut 21:22-23). Blomberg expresses the 
implications of a crucified messiah this way: “No would-be Messiah could possibly be legitimate 
if crucified as a criminal by the Roman regime.”241 If God approved of Jesus’ life, however, the 
necessity arises for God to vindicate and act on behalf of Jesus to avoid leaving the impression 
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that he was cursed rather than glorified. This is likely given the following items of background 
knowledge: (1) it is in line with the majority view of critical scholars due to the strong historical 
attestation that Jesus and his followers thought that he performed miracles and exorcisms,242 and 
(2) Paul infers that the Resurrection authenticated Jesus as the Son of God (cf. Rom 1:3-4). 
Therefore, it is more probable that God would raise Jesus from the dead after subjecting him to 
the death penalty by means of crucifixion. As Swinburne writes, such an act “would constitute 
God’s authenticating signature on the life of Jesus.”243 Since this argument is not only based on 
historical but also theological considerations, the initial probability 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) is set to slightly 
probable (0.6), so as to account for the uncertainties involved in these deliberations.  
An advantage of the OVH over the SVH is that it supposes that there was a less fluid 
transition in the disciples’ faith in the period between shortly prior to and after Jesus’ death. The 
SVH needs to minimize the negative impact of Jesus’ death. According to Grass, this is not taken 
seriously enough on the view that they experienced merely subjective visions.244 Indeed, it seems 
a priori probable that Jesus’ death had a very negative impact on the disciples’ faith, even apart 
from the textual evidence in favor of it (e.g. Mk 16:8). The OVH renders it more likely that God 
would overcome the negative impact of Jesus’ death on the disciples’ faith by bringing about an 
objective vision such that the disciples would uphold the veracity of their message and proclaim 
the gospel. As a result, 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) needs to be shifted upwards to 80%. 
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Fact 2: 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) 
The OVH explains the disciples’ claims concerning Jesus’ appearances after his death. If 
God objectively appeared to the disciples in visions, it is likely they would have thought and 
claimed that Jesus appeared to them. If objective visions entail similar visual (and auditory) 
effects as subjective visions, and if God can bring about such effects, then the conditional 
probability of objective appearances is initially as high as for subjective visions. Given the 
theistic underpinnings of the OVH, the OVH ensures that God can bring about visions with 
effects similar to subjective visions. This is warranted because God’s existence is accounted for 
in the prior probability of this hypothesis. Thus, it is initially probable (80%). 
The OVH better explains the multiplicity and qualitative differences of the appearances 
than the SVH. The latter views the visions as some sort of chain reaction, namely that starting 
from some individuals such as Peter, the appearances spread. On the other hand, the OVH 
suggests that these appearances were more independent. In support of this contention, Grass 
points out that the appearances to Paul and James, in contrast to the ones to Peter and other 
disciples point towards an independence of these appearances because of the time gap in between 
them.245 Pannenberg distinguishes between the earlier appearance to Peter, then the appearance to 
James (who did not belong to the very earliest witnesses), and Paul (three years after Jesus’ 
death).246 The hypothesis that Jesus appeared to individuals at various points in time fits better 
with the sporadic appearances. This makes the hypothesis slightly more likely. But the argument 
is not sufficiently strong so as to change it to very probable. 
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The anthropology of the early church plays another important role in estimating the 
conditional probability concerning the appearances. According to the OVH, Jesus did not appear 
to the disciples in a physical body. But if it can be shown that Paul or the other disciples believed 
in the physicality of Jesus’ resurrection body, then the likelihood of them confusing the non-
physical appearance with a corporeal one needs to be considered. This is why their conception of 
the resurrection body plays an important role. Besides this, it is crucial to recognize that Paul 
does not necessarily equate the nature of Jesus’ appearance in his case with the appearances to 
the other disciples (cf. 1 Cor 15:3-8).247 In fact, O’Connell states that the phrase “one untimely 
born,” which directly precedes Paul’s testimony about Jesus’ appearance to him in 1 Corinthians 
15:8, “indicates Paul knew there was something different about his appearance.”248 Thus, the 
views of and appearances to both individuals or groups need to be discussed separately. 
In Paul’s case, there are strong reasons for believing that he anticipated a physical 
resurrection body. As Allison writes, “there is just no good evidence for belief in a non-physical 
resurrection in Paul . . . .”249 Gundry offers the following arguments for the view that Paul 
thought of the resurrection body in physical terms: (1) Paul being a Pharisee (cf. Phil 3:5) would 
have probably embraced the Pharisaical view of a physical resurrection, (2) the juxtaposition of 
the buried and the raised body in 1 Corinthians 15:3-4 implies a physical resurrection, (3) Paul’s 
somatic reference concerning the transformation of “our lowly body” in the likeness Christ’s 
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“glorious body” in Phil 3:20-21.250 As argued above (cf. “Fact 2: 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻)”), it is likely that 
people in the first century (and Paul especially) were able to distinguish between corporeal and 
non-corporeal visual perceptions. This renders it unlikely that Paul was unable to distinguish a 
discrepancy, had there been one. 
It is sometimes argued that the OVH fits well with Paul’s experience on the road to 
Damascus (cf. Acts 9, 22 and 26). As Pannenberg notes, this appearance must be referred to as a 
vision because Paul saw something that others who were present did not see.251 In Acts 26:19, it 
is even specified that this was a “heavenly vision.” However, even though these details do not 
necessarily contradict fact 2, they are not part of this fact and do not represent the historical 
bedrock. Moreover, there are reasons for omitting this detail. As Fuller points out, even though 
Paul admits having experienced visions (cf. 2 Cor 12:1ff), he carefully avoids using this term in 
relation to his Damascus road experience. Given that only the epistles of Paul are taken into 
account which are regarded as authentic and that are superior in historical value concerning this 
event,252 it should not be adduced as evidence in the present investigation. But even if this data 
could be adduced, the evidence is still inconclusive. For in response of the claim that Acts attests 
to a non-physical appearance of Jesus to Paul, O’Connell points to the possibility that Paul’s 
companions did not see Jesus because they did not look into the light (and thus were not blinded 
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like Paul), even though Jesus was there to be seen.253 Consequently, this line of reasoning neither 
speaks in favor of nor against the OVH and is thus neglected. 
With respect to disciples other than Paul, the Gospels themselves already indicate that 
first-century Christians distinguished between real people and ghosts and that under uncertain 
and extraordinary circumstances they tended to classify an unknown being as a ghost (Mk 6:49, 
Mt 14:26). With this information in mind, there are the following two options: (1) the early 
church held and continued to hold to the physicality of the resurrection (as reflected in the 
Gospels), or (2) it developed between AD 30 and ca. AD 70/80, when the Gospels were written. 
The first option seems more plausible, especially because Paul believed in a physical resurrection 
body, he conversed with other leaders of the early church in Jerusalem, and he spread this view 
around the Mediterranean churches already between AD 30 and AD 70. But it is unlikely that the 
disciples would have claimed that Jesus’ resurrection body was physical had they only 
experienced a (non-physical) OV. In that case, they would have had to maintain theological 
beliefs that were in conflict with what they actually had experienced. Considering the second 
option, it could be argued that it was only until later in the first century that Christians started to 
believe in the physical Resurrection of Jesus. But due to the short time period between the Easter 
events and the time when the Gospels were recorded, it is unlikely that the early church changed 
from a non-physical to a physical resurrection, as reflected in the Gospels, within a matter of 
decades. After all, some of the disciples could then still have served as “authoritative guarantors 
of their traditions,” as Bauckham convincingly argues.254 
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As a result of the argument concerning the anthropology within the early church, the likelihood 
𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) is lowered to slightly improbable (40%), since it is unlikely that not only Paul but 
also the other disciples would confuse a physical with a non-physical appearance. 
The text in 1 Corinthians 15:5-7 attests that Jesus appeared to groups of people (“the 
twelve,” “more than five hundred brothers” and “all the apostles”) at the same time. The 
historicity of the appearances to these groups poses a dilemma. According to the OVH, only 
those people who were enabled by God could see Jesus. It is either possible that (1) these groups 
only consisted of people whom God allowed to have such an experience or (2) there were some 
people present who did not see Jesus alive. The texts do not tell which of the two options is 
correct. However, it seems that the OVH faces difficulties in both cases. On the one hand, if it is 
claimed that God granted such a vision to all of them, then the OVH could be accused of 
explaining away the data for the following reason. According to the RH, every person present 
during an appearance could have seen Jesus. To explain the data away, the advocate of the OVH 
can simply claim that God enabled everyone present to see Jesus. This is, of course, possible, but 
the more group appearances such an argument is applied to, the more arbitrary the hypothesis 
becomes. On the other hand, if some people were present who did not experience such a vision, 
it might not only have led to a confusion amongst the people present and antagonism towards 
those who claimed to have such experiences as a result of this experiential discrepancy, but it 
could also have been powerfully employed by adversaries who claimed that Jesus was not raised 
from the dead.255 Even though it is likely that such a discrepancy would have been exploited, the 
historical records do not seem to give the indication that it was. This renders the hypothesis 
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slightly less likely, but not sufficiently strong such that 𝑝(𝐹2|𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) should be further decreased. 
Therefore, the likelihood of observing fact 2 given the OVH remains slightly improbable (40%). 
Fact 3: 𝑝(𝐹3 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻) 
Grass finds it implausible that Paul’s conversion resulted from a religious crisis, since 
there are no indications in the New Testament writings that he slowly opened up to Christianity 
or turned against his paternal religion.256 On the contrary, he says, Christ revealed himself to the 
disciples as exalted Lord such that they became confident that He was alive.257 Indeed, if Jesus 
objectively appeared to Paul, it is more likely that this would have turned around his life and 
caused him to proclaim the gospel message. In other words, God’s direct involvement, as 
opposed to mere psychological phenomena, in the appearances increases the likelihood that this 
would have led to a transformation in Paul (or for the matter any other disciple). Thus, this 
hypothesis does not exhibit the same deficiency as the SVH, in which it is unlikely that Paul’s 
experience resulted from wish-fulfillment or other hidden psychological motives. On the OVH, it 
is more probable that he would have converted and started to spread Christianity around the 
Mediterranean world because God could have reassured the disciples of the truth of the reality of 
Jesus’ Resurrection. 
In addition to God being able to bring about such a change, it is also reasonable to expect 
that God would choose to reveal himself to Paul, since he played a crucial role in the persecution 
of the church (and could therefore have caused further damage to the church). Moreover, because 
of his theological education as a Jewish rabbi, which was evidently beneficial to the church, as 
 
256 Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte, 242. 
257 Ibid., 246. 
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demonstrated by the theological depth of the Pauline epistles, it is likely that God would choose 
to reveal himself to him. Consequently, it is probable (80%) that Paul’s transformation is to be 
expected under the OVH. 
Prior Probability: 𝑝(𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻|𝑘) 
The prior probability of the OVH involves the probability of theism and the likelihood 
that God would raise Jesus (in non-bodily form) from the dead. As elucidated in chapter 1, the 
prior probability is not computed for hypotheses that involve a supernatural element. Estimating 
the probability of theism involves too many additional considerations pertaining to the field of 
natural (a)theology such as the various arguments for God’s existence or objections like the 
problem of evil. For these reasons 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻|𝑘), the minim value needed so that a supernatural 
hypothesis becomes more likely than the most probable alternative hypothesis, is computed in 
chapter 4.  
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Resurrection Hypothesis 
According to the RH, Jesus of Nazareth appeared to several individuals after his death by 
crucifixion. As in the case of the OVH, this constitutes “a supernatural event brought about by 
God,” writes Groothuis.258 The RH further holds that Jesus appeared to various individuals in a 
physical body after his death. It is important, however, that the hypothesis is not understood in 
such a way that the continuity between Jesus’ physical pre- and post-Resurrection body is 
overemphasized because it would be out of sync with Jewish resurrection beliefs in general and 
Paul’s teaching in 1 Corinthians 15 in particular. Bryan clarifies: 
The first followers of Jesus seem to have experienced his "being raised" as involving the 
physical, but more precisely as involving a transformed physicality-a transformed formed 
physicality that they perceived in terms of Jewish resurrection belief and Jewish 
eschatological hope.259 
 
One of the characteristics of the RH is that it involves normal visual perception. 
According to Davis, this normal vision “entails both (1) that the perceptual processes work as 
they regularly do, and (2) that the object seen is a material object.”260 Advocates of this 
hypothesis maintain that Jesus was ordinarily seen after his death such that, in contrast to the 
OVH, had others been present during one of the appearances, they would have been able to see 
him as well. The RH maintains that the disciples’ confidence in Jesus was strengthened and they 
started to proclaim that Jesus is risen and alive, as a result of these encounters. 
  
 
258 Douglas R. Groothuis, Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011), 530. 
259 Bryan, The Resurrection of the Messiah, loc. 505-507. 
260 Davis, Kendall, and O’Collins, The Resurrection, 127. 
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Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑅𝐻) 
In the same way as the OVH (cf. “Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻)”), the RH posits a different order 
of causality and events in contrast to the SVH. The claim is thus that the appearances produced 
belief in Jesus’ Resurrection. Likewise, it is due to theological necessity that God raised Jesus 
from the dead to vindicate him. Hence, the initial estimate for this factor amounts to the estimate 
for the OVH because the same arguments apply. The initial value of 𝑝(𝐹1|𝐻𝑅𝐻) is, therefore, set 
to probable (80%). However, there are additional factors that need to be taken into consideration 
because they affect this probability. 
Since Jesus died physically, it is more likely that God would raise him also bodily to 
make us clear that his sacrificial death was accepted by God. Swinburne sketches this argument 
as follows: 
God accepts a life offered for us if he brings it to life again and allows it to benefit us. 
Our human life is an embodied life; God would accept the gift of the embodied life of 
Jesus by bringing him to life again in his body, that is, by bodily resurrecting him. God 
would accept the sacrifice by taking it away (not leaving the body in the tomb) to be 
(apparently) with himself, and by allowing us to plead that sacrifice in atonement for our 
sins. But if God is to do this, Jesus must make it clear to us that he is making available his 
life as a sacrifice.261 
 
In contrast to Old Testament characters such as Enoch (Gen 5:24) or Elijah (2 Ki 2:1ff), 
who were taken up into heaven, the early Christians claimed that Jesus died a sacrificial death 
(“Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures” (1 Cor 15:3)). Because of this 
difference there is a didactical need for God to show to humanity that God raised Jesus from the 
dead and thereby accepted his sacrifice for our sins. It is, of course, possible that God could have 
taken Jesus up into heaven without resurrecting his body. But it is easier to infer that Jesus’ 
 
261 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 190. 
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sacrifice was accepted, if God raised Him bodily rather than non-bodily. Moreover, due to the 
widespread belief in a physical afterlife amongst Jews, it is more probable that God would have 
chosen to raise him bodily in order to avoid leaving them with a cognitive dissonance or, even 
worse, theologically confused. 
As a result of the previous considerations, it is, therefore, very probable (95%) to observe 
Jesus’ Resurrection in conjunction with his death because it vindicates his life and teaches 
humanity that Jesus’ sacrificial death on our behalf was accepted by God. 
Fact 2: 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑅𝐻) 
It is sometimes said that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence to overcome 
suspicion against such claims. Unfortunately, this principle is rarely applied to the origin of the 
disciples’ faith. Wright’s discussion of the story of Simon bar Giora, a leader whom many Jews 
regarded as the Messiah around AD 66-70 and who was flogged and crucified, helps to illustrate 
this point. Wright takes on the perspective of Simon’s followers and argues that people would 
have rejected, if someone had claimed to “have had a sense of presence” of such a leader.262 
Instead, people may have responded something along these lines: “Why are you saying he has 
been raised from the dead? He clearly hasn't been; he's still dead and buried; and if he hasn't been 
raised then he certainly wasn't and isn't the Messiah.”263 In contrast, if Jesus was raised bodily 
and appeared to the disciples, it is likely that God could have overcome their doubt and 
suspicion. It is possible that some may have doubted at first. But surely, if anything, it is a real 
bodily Resurrection that would most likely lead people to claim that Jesus was actually raised. 
 
262 Evans and Wright, Jesus, the Final Days, loc. 972. 
263 Ibid., loc. 976-977. 
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Consequently, if something extraordinary happened, as the RH claims, it is probable that the 
disciples would have claimed that Jesus was raised. 
The argument in the previous paragraph, namely that it is more likely that the disciples 
would have claimed that Jesus was raised in comparison to the discussed visionary experiences 
of the SVH or the OVH, is also supported by two more considerations. First, recall Craig’s 
argument that visions “would have only led the disciples to say Jesus had been translated or 
assumed into heaven, not raised from the dead.”264 This argument as elucidated in Fact 2: 
𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻) favors the RH. Second, Wright adds that the disciples might have thought that Jesus 
would return some day in the future, but not that he actually has already done so.265 On the RH it 
is probable that the disciples would not only have claimed that Jesus appeared to them, but that 
he was in fact raised from the dead and thus alive, not at some time in the future, but already in 
the presence. 
In contrast to the OVH and the SVH, the anthropology of the early church favors the RH 
because it emphasized the physicality of the resurrection body. Wright summarizes that “if a 
first-century Jew said that someone had been ‘raised from the dead,’ the one thing they did not 
mean was that such a person had gone to a state of disembodied bliss, there either to rest forever 
or to wait until the great day of re-embodiment.”266 The fact that the Jewish expectation consisted 
of a “re-embodiment” points to a continuity in Judeo-Christian thought because no discrepancy 
 
264 Craig, Reasonable Faith, 394. 
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arises between their expectations of a physical (although future) resurrection body and their 
claim that Jesus was raised bodily. 
Appearances to large groups are relatively more likely under the RH, especially in 
comparison to the SVH, for several reasons. Firstly, O’Connell suggests that since Jesus gathered 
groups during his earthly ministry, it is plausible that he would have desired to do so after his 
Resurrection.267 Most critical scholars accept that Jesus dealt with larger groups, particularly 
because Jesus would have been expected to teach crowds, similarly to the rabbis of his time.268 
Secondly, it is sometimes objected why Jesus did not appear to more people, but this surely 
implies that a person making such an objection expects that Jesus would appear to more people. 
It is probable that God wants to show to many people that Jesus was raised, if this was indeed the 
case and thus more probable that he would also appear to groups. Thirdly, an appearance to 
multiple people at the same time would have provided a better evidential basis for people to 
believe that Jesus was actually raised. The fact that group appearances provided grounds for 
believing in Jesus’ Resurrection is evident from the creed in 1 Cor 13:5b-7, where Paul cites not 
less than three group appearances. On the RH it is not only likely that Jesus would appear to 
groups, but he would also certainly have the power to do so. Therefore, group appearances are 
extremely probable (99%) given the RH. 
  
 
267 O’Connell, Jesus’ Resurrection and Apparitions, loc. 6259. 
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Fact 3: 𝑝(𝐹3 |𝐻𝑅𝐻) 
As in case of the OVH, the RH can avail itself of the possibility that God actively 
intervened in the natural order of events when Jesus appeared to Paul. Such an intervention by 
God certainly provides the necessary ground for the transformational and long-lasting effects the 
encounter had on Paul. Based on the reasons described when considering the OVH, the initial 
value of 𝑝(𝐹3 |𝐻𝑅𝐻) is set to probable. 
The RH is the hypothesis that takes Paul’s own testimony concerning his encounter with 
Jesus and the change it brought about in his life most seriously. This also includes Paul’s 
proclamation that because Jesus was raised Christians will one day also be raised and obtain a 
new, transformed body. The way Paul perceived of believers’ future bodies is directly relevant. 
As addressed in “Fact 2: 𝑝(𝐹2 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻)” Paul not only believed in the physicality of the 
resurrection bodies, but he also equated them with the glorified resurrection body of Jesus (Phil 
3:20-22). 
To investigate the veracity of this encounter, two issues need to be addressed: (1) whether 
Paul could trust his own experience and (2) whether his testimony as passed on in the Pauline 
epistles can be trusted. If these two conditions are met, then it is very likely that it was the kind 
of encounter which turned Paul’s life upside down, in the way he claims it to have.  In examining 
the question concerning the trustworthiness of Paul’s testimony, Swinburne’s principle of 
credulity is directly relevant. He summarizes it as follows: 
It is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considerations), if it seems 
(epistemically) to a subject that x is present (and has some characteristic), then probably x 
is present (and has that characteristic); what one seems to perceive is probably so.269 
 
 
269 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 303. 
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When the principle is applied to Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus, and before any 
indications to the contrary are considered, Paul is epistemically justified to believe that since it 
seemed to him that Jesus appeared to him, this probably also was the case. But special 
considerations that would result in a false perception need to be addressed. 
 The first one relates to whether the conditions (at the time of the experience) would have 
rendered the perceptions unreliable or whether the subject was found unreliable in the past.270 Of 
the potential conditions that could have rendered Paul’s perception unreliable, medical 
conditions that result in hallucinatory experiences seem to be the most probable ones. But as 
discussed in the “Fact 3: 𝑝(𝐹3 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻),” it is first of all very difficult to identify the exact medical 
condition and, secondly, unlikely that Paul would have continued to maintain the belief in the 
veracity of the experience in the long-run. The fact that Paul did claim to have had visionary 
experiences (cf. 2 Cor 12:2-4) may render it somewhat plausible that his encounter with Jesus on 
the road to Damascus was similar. But to argue that these perceptions were unreliable, it needs to 
be presupposed that those other encounters were merely subjective. Moreover, even if those 
experiences were subjective, this need not be applied to his encounter with the risen Christ as 
Paul sharply distinguishes those experiences. The second potential claim, namely that Paul was 
found unreliable concerning such experiences in the past, fails in the absence of evidence in 
support of this contention. 
There are two more special considerations to be made. First, whether it can be shown that 
it is very unlikely that Paul had such an experience and second, whether Jesus’ presence would 
have convinced Paul of the reality of the appearance.271 It is very improbable that Paul could have 
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had such an experience, if the prior probability of the RH is set very low. But this is accounted 
for in the prior probability of the hypothesis. Given theistic belief, however, the principle of 
credulity continues to hold for the RH. With respect to the latter issue (namely whether Jesus’ 
presence would have allowed Paul to believe that Jesus was also actually present), it seems fairly 
clear that an actual appearance of Jesus could have and did indeed overcome Paul’s intuitions to 
the contrary and potential doubts. 
As introduced above, it could be objected that Paul’s testimony cannot be trusted. If this 
is the case, then Swinburne’s principle of testimony, which entails that “other things being equal, 
we believe that what others tell us that they perceived probably happened,”272 is not met. Now 
there may be grounds for scepticism concerning religious claims. But in Paul’s case it is unlikely 
that he was a habitual liar, lied or exaggerated in order to gain attention, or that he would have 
misremembered the crux of this crucial event. What can be done to test such a claim, is to “see 
whether the subject’s lifestyle has undergone change,”273 as Swinburne suggests. But this is part 
of fact 3, which also entails that Paul suffered for proclaiming the Christian message. 
Consequently, these special considerations yield insufficient grounds for doubting that 
the principle of credulity and the principle of testimony are met. It therefore appears that the 
religious experience Paul claimed to have made and the inferences he made based on this 
experience are very probable (95%). 
 
272 Ibid., 322. 
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Prior Probability: 𝑝(𝐻𝑅𝐻|𝑘) 
For the same reasons as for the OVH, the prior probability of the RH (another hypothesis 
involving the supernatural) is also not estimated. However, because it is sometimes argued that 
philosophical problems are involved with the concept of a bodily resurrection, its effects on the 
prior probability needs to be addressed. O’Connell recognizes that “if the concept of physical 
resurrection is incoherent, then clearly Jesus could not have risen from the dead.”274 If this is 
correct, the prior probability of the RH is very low (if not even zero) and thus likely lower than 
for the OVH. This is not to say that it remains difficult to estimate more precisely to what degree 
this argument might shift the prior probability of the hypothesis up- or downwards. In any case, 
if the idea of a physical resurrection lacks coherence, this would negatively affect the likelihood 
of the RH and would, therefore, necessarily lead to preference of another hypothesis. 
Murray recognizes that the numerical identity of a physical resurrection body poses an 
important issue when he raises the question about “how a body that has been destroyed could 
possibly be numerically identical with a body that exists long after the destruction.”275 Allison 
ponders this problem using the example of Polycarp’s martyred body. After alluding to the 
possibility that God could make three Polycarps out of the atoms that constituted his body at 
three different stages in his life (say thirty, fifty and seventy), he then asks which of them is the 
real one.276 At least two remarks need to be made in response. Firstly, the objection probably does 
not apply to Jesus, since in contrast to Polycarp’s case, his body did not (sufficiently) decay due 
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to the short amount of time between his death and purported resurrection. Although secondly, 
even if the objection applies, Craig responds that this objection at most implies duplicity rather 
than numerical identity of these bodies, but that it does not “preclude personal identity of the 
deceased and resurrected individual if one believes . . . in the reality of a soul distinct from the 
body.”277 More could be said about this issue, but it appears that the concept of a bodily 
resurrection does not constitute a defeater in any case for the hypothesis. 
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Chapter 4 – Discussion of Results 
 
Overview 
In this section the results of the previous chapter are listed, compared and evaluated. The 
estimated probabilities for each fact given its hypothesis and the prior probability for the SVH 
are displayed in table 1. 
 SVH OVH RH 
𝑃(𝐹1|𝐻) 0.40 0.8 0.95 
𝑃(𝐹2|𝐻) 0.50 0.40 0.99 
𝑃(𝐹3|𝐻) 0.05 0.8 0.95 
𝑃(𝐻|𝑘) 0.20 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑂𝑉𝐻|𝑘) 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅𝐻|𝑘) 
Table 1. Estimated Probabilities 
The estimated values in table 1 indicate that in terms of conditional probabilities, the RH 
renders all three facts more likely than the other hypotheses. The first fact relates to how 
probable each hypothesis is, given Jesus’ death by crucifixion. Here the SVH is rendered slightly 
improbable, particularly because of its inability to show how subjective visions could have 
resulted from the bereavement process of the disciples after Jesus’ death or by similar means. 
The other two hypotheses provide better grounds to account for the causal order of the events 
and the negative impact Jesus’ death had on their faith; it is further strengthened because on 
these hypotheses God would have had sufficient reasons for vindicating Jesus. 
Although at first glance each of the hypotheses appears to explain the appearances of 
Jesus (i.e. fact 2) similarly well, the final estimates do differ. The estimates are lower for the 
SVH and the OVH because the other hypotheses suffer from the problem that a risen Messiah 
was not according to Jewish expectation and because it is relatively likely that the early disciples 
would have detected or not continued to maintain the mismatch between the content of their 
experiences and their proclamation. The estimate for the RH is higher because it better explains 
the multiplicity and the qualitative differences of the appearances. 
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With respect to the transformation of Paul, a man who was turned from a persecutor of 
the Christian church to an evangelist and preacher of the gospel message as a result of his 
encounter with Jesus, the OVH and the RH once again better explain the data than does the SVH. 
Paul does not seem to exhibit the psychological or medical conditions that could result in the 
kind of subjective visionary experiences that are posited. Moreover, he sharply distinguishes 
between visionary experiences and his Damascus road experience. And it is unlikely that a mere 
subjective experience would have had such a long-lasting impact. On the other hand, due to the 
supernatural characteristics of the OVH and the RH, these two hypotheses can posit God as the 
cause of this transformation and are therefore more likely. However, the RH is slightly more 
probable than the OVH because if the principles of credulity and testimony are met, Paul’s 
inference that the believers’ resurrection body is physical, as Jesus’ glorious body is, can be 
trusted because this was what he actually saw in his encounter with Jesus. 
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Independence Assumption 
As previously remarked in “Refined Methodology,” one important underlying 
assumption of the approach, in which conditional probabilities of the various facts given a 
particular hypothesis are multiplied with one another, is the independence between the various 
facts. If these probabilities are not independent of one another, then the product of these 
conditional probabilities and consequently also the computed posterior probability may be over- 
or underestimated. 
First, consider the relationship between the appearances of Jesus to the disciples and the 
transformation of Paul. It was primarily the appearances of Jesus to the disciples, including Peter 
and the appearance to more than 500 men, that were considered. The appearance to Paul was not 
included in the second fact, since it is not part of the original creed in 1 Corinthians 15. It may be 
objected that the primary testimony for these appearances is derived from Paul’s letter and thus 
there is some dependency between these two facts. But, as explained in “Fact 2: After his death, 
Jesus appeared to various disciples, James and Saul of Tarsus,” even though the testimony was 
written down by Paul, he himself received it from others, most likely Peter and James in 
Jerusalem three years after his own transformative experience on the road to Damascus. Because 
of this chronological sequence and the independence between Paul’s experience and the way the 
creed was formed, these two factors are very likely independent of each other. 
Second, we need to examine whether there is a potential dependency between Jesus’ 
death and Paul’s transformation. The fact that Saul persecuted Christians is indeed to some 
extent positively related to Jesus’ death. In Saul’s view, at that time, Jesus would probably have 
been a false Messiah, one who failed to accomplish his mission. But this relationship is, of 
course, insufficient to bring about a transformation. Jesus’ death must somehow be related to 
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Paul’s transformational experience in order for there to be a dependency. This potential 
dependence must be considered for each hypothesis. 
With respect to the SVH, the discussion in “Fact 3: 𝑝(𝐹3 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻)” did not yield any purely 
psychological or medical condition as a result of which Paul encountered Jesus on the road to 
Damascus and which is directly related to Jesus’ death. The most likely candidates that led to 
this encounter, wishful thinking or bereavement, are far less likely to apply to Paul than in case 
of the other disciples, who had followed Jesus already prior to his death. 
In case of the OVH and the RH, it is difficult to think of any way in which these two facts 
would be related to each other. Moreover, since between one and three years had passed after 
Jesus’ death at the time when Paul encountered Jesus (see “Fact 2: After his death, Jesus 
appeared to various disciples, James and Saul of Tarsus”), it is unlikely that there is a direct 
relationship between the two facts under all three hypotheses anyway. 
Third, Jesus’ death and the appearances to multiple individuals, including the disciples, 
need to be discussed. These two facts are the most likely ones that may be related to each other. 
The product of the conditional probabilities may be underestimated especially given the SVH. If 
the appearances to the disciples are bereavement hallucinations (BHs), Jesus’ death plays a major 
role in explaining those appearances. It is noted above the likelihood of widows experiencing 
BHs is approximately 10%-17%, but that only sporadic case reports are known in which a son, 
relative or friend experiences a BH.278 Therefore, unless it can be shown that BHs are more likely 
to occur in cases where the mourner is not a widow, it is unlikely that there is a strong 
relationship between fact one and two in case of the SVH. 
 
278 See Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑆𝑉𝐻). 
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In case of the two hypotheses OVH and RH these two facts may be positively related to 
each other and the product of these probabilities may, therefore, be underestimated. As argued in 
“Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑂𝑉𝐻)” and which also applies to the RH (cf. “Fact 1: 𝑝(𝐹1 |𝐻𝑅𝐻)”), Jesus’ death 
by crucifixion made him appear as a person cursed by God. On the OVH and the RH, God 
approved of Jesus’ life by raising Jesus from the dead. Hence, there is a direct relationship 
between these two facts and the independence assumption leads to an underestimation of the 
posterior probabilities for these hypotheses of a similar magnitude. But since this would only 
strengthen the case for a supernatural hypothesis, the probabilities need not be adjusted upwards. 
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Implications 
It is now time to consider the prior probabilities of the hypotheses. As pointed out above, 
one way to overcome the influences of worldview (philosophical and theological considerations) 
lies in computing the minimum prior probability of a supernatural hypothesis such that this 
hypothesis becomes more probable than the best alternative natural hypothesis. As a result of the 
historical investigation in chapter 2, in which three historical facts surrounding Jesus’ death and 
post-mortem appearances are identified, several natural hypotheses (including the swoon, legend 
and fraud hypothesis) dropped out of the pool of candidates because they do not explain these 
facts. Thus, only the subjective vision hypothesis remained due to its potential ability to explain 
the resurrection appearances. The prior probability for the SVH is 0.2 because visionary 
experiences were not too uncommon (at that time or in general) but it is nevertheless low 
because first-century Jews did not normally expect a resurrection prior to the end times. 
Next, the minimum prior probability for the OVH is computed. Recall that this is the 
minimum value that needs to be assigned to the prior probability of the OVH such that the OVH 
is more probable than the SVH, the natural hypothesis that best explains the three facts identified 
in chapter 2. The value for 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑂𝑉𝐻|𝑘) is computed as follows: 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑂𝑉𝐻|𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑓1│ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓2│ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓3|ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑓1│ℎ𝑂𝑉𝐻, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓2│ℎ𝑂𝑉𝐻, 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓3|ℎ𝑂𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘)
=
0.4 ⋅ 0.5 ⋅ 0.05 ⋅ 0.2
0.8 ⋅ 0.4 ⋅ 0.8
= 0.0078 = 0.78% 
Surprisingly, this value does not need to be very large because the OVH explains the data much 
better than does the SVH, especially when it comes to explaining the transformation in Paul’s 
life. More shall be said about how, and under which circumstances this value is obtained. 
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Before doing so, however, the minimum prior probability of the RH needs to be 
computed in order to provide a direct comparison between the OVH and the RH: 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛(ℎ𝑅𝐻|𝑘) =
𝑃(𝑓1│ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓2│ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓3|ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(ℎ𝑆𝑉𝐻|𝑘)
𝑃(𝑓1│ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓2│ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑓3|ℎ𝑅 , 𝑘)
=
0.4 ⋅ 0.5 ⋅ 0.05 ⋅ 0.2
0.95 ⋅ 0.99 ⋅ 0.95
= 0.0022 = 0.22% 
The value of 0.0022 is even lower than for the OVH (0.0078). This is due to the fact that the 
three historical facts are more likely to be expected under the RH than under the OVH. As 
addressed earlier, the prior probability of the RH does not necessarily need to be lower than for 
the OVH because the physicality of the resurrection body is not an incoherent concept. 
Therefore, unless other deficiencies pertaining to the prior probability of the RH can be shown, 
the RH should be preferred over the OVH, if these three historical facts are considered. 
Finally, several considerations need to be made as to under which conditions the prior 
probability of the RH reaches a minimum value of 0.0022, such that it should be preferred over 
the SVH. Swinburne suggests that the prior probability of God becoming incarnate is a product 
of the probability of God becoming incarnate 𝑝(𝑐|𝑡, 𝑘) and of the likelihood of God’s existence 
𝑝(𝑡|𝑘).279 The same reasoning applied to the Resurrection yields that the prior probability of the 
Resurrection is the product of how likely it is that God exists 𝑝(𝑡|𝑘) and that He would raise 
Jesus from the dead 𝑝(𝑟|𝑡, 𝑘). The mathematical relationship between these two factors can be 
expressed mathematically as follows: 
𝑝(𝑡|𝑘) = 0.0022 ⋅
1
𝑝(𝑟|𝑡, 𝑘)
 
 
279 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 213. 
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Alternatively, it can be displayed graphically, as in figure 1. The graph shows under 
which circumstances the prior probability of the RH reaches 0.0022. Each historian will, of 
course, assign different values to these two probabilities, depending on that person’s worldview 
and their stance, for instance towards arguments for or against God’s existence. In any case, if 
someone assigns any of these values such that its coordinates lie in the green area above the 
black line, then the RH should be preferred. What is perhaps most striking is that the issues of 
worldview should, in fact, not influence the decision as to which hypothesis is to be preferred, to 
the extent to which it has sometimes been suggested in the past. This is due to the superiority of 
the RH in comparison to the most likely natural alternative hypothesis, the SVH. 
 
 
Figure 1. Factors affecting the prior probability of RH 
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As figure 1 shows, if someone believes that it is at least slightly probable that God exists 
( > 60%) and it is more than improbable ( > 20%) that God would raise Jesus from the dead, then 
the prior probability of the Resurrection is already sufficiently large (> 12%) such that the person 
should accept the RH given the previous historical considerations discussed above (see brown 
circle in figure 1). In fact, even if a relatively low probability of 0.1 is assumed for both God’s 
existence and that He would raise Jesus from the dead, that person is still epistemically justified 
in regarding the RH as more probable than the SVH (see red circle in figure 1). 
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Further Reflections 
In this section, it shall be briefly sketched how these results fit in with religious 
epistemology and natural theology. Plantinga convincingly argues that theistic (and Christian) 
belief can and probably does have warrant, if theism (or Christianity) is true.280 In this case, all 
humans could rightly trust their innate sense of the divine or what Calvin referred to as the 
sensus divinitatis, even apart from considering sophisticated arguments for and against God’s 
existence. At the same time, however, Plantinga also maintains that it could not be warranted, if 
the belief is false.281 His ultimate conclusion based on these observations is, then, that the de jure 
question (viz. whether theistic belief is warranted) is related to the de facto question (viz. 
whether theism is actually true).282 
There are numerous issues related to the de facto question. They include atheological 
objections, primarily the evidential argument from evil,283 but also, for instance, arguments that 
the concept of God is problematic in one way or another.284 These objections need to be weighed 
against the arguments for God’s existence, particularly the traditional ones such as the 
 
280 Alvin Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2015), 39. 
281 Ibid., 38. 
282 Ibid., 41. 
283 See the dialog between Rowe and Wykstra: William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties 
of Atheism,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M. Adams, Oxford Readings in Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments 
from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn M. Adams and Robert 
M. Adams, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); however, it should be 
noted that evil also poses a problem on other worldviews, including naturalism. See Ronnie P. Campbell, Jr., 
Worldviews & the Problem of Evil: A Comparative Approach (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2019). 
284 For an introduction, see Bede Rundle, “Problems with the Concept of God,” in The Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chad V. Meister and Paul Copan, 2nd ed., Routledge Philosophy 
Companions (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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ontological,285 teleological,286 cosmological,287 or moral argument.288 Ideally, a cumulative case is 
made, one in which both arguments for and against God’s existence are taken into account, in 
similar fashion to the case made by Swinburne.289 
In his response to the debate between Crossan and Wright in March, 2005, Geivett points 
in the right direction as to how such arguments need to be taken into account when considering 
the Resurrection. He observes that both of them “ground their verdicts about the Resurrection on 
historical evidence that prescinds from any particular metaphysical perspective, conceptual 
framework, or worldview.”290 He goes on to say that the range of explanations that someone 
considers depends on one’s worldview commitments.291 
Geivett’s observations are spot on. Future studies on Jesus’ miraculous feats or the 
Resurrection in particular need to elucidate what constitutes their worldview and what stance 
they take regarding the value of natural theology. Moreover, if the assessment of this thesis is 
correct, advocates of natural hypotheses need to find very strong arguments against God’s 
 
285 Alvin Plantinga, “The Ontological Argument,” in God, Freedom, and Evil, reprinted. (Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2001). 
286 Robin Collins, “The Argument from Physical Constants: The Fine-Tuning for Discoverability,” in Two 
Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project, ed. Trent Dougherty and Jerry L. Walls (New York, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
287 William L. Craig and James D. Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
288 The argument is laid out in an abductive form by David Baggett, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and 
Human Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The 
Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
289 Swinburne, The Existence of God. 
290 Douglas R. Geivett, “The Epistemology of Resurrection Belief,” in The Resurrection of Jesus: John 
Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright in Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006), 
93–94. 
291 Ibid., 96–97. 
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existence so as to be rationally justified in adopting a naturalistic worldview.292 This, however, 
would seem to go against the current atmosphere in the philosophy departments, for even 
naturalist philosophers such as Quentin Smith claim, “God’s not ‘dead’ in academia; he returned 
to life in the late 1960s and is now alive and well in his last academic stronghold, philosophy 
departments.”293 
Consequently, as long as no stronger case is made against theism, it would be too 
simplistic and it would not suffice if, based on the reasoning that miracles are the least probable 
events,294 historians merely assert: 
. . . there are lots of other explanations for what happened to Jesus that are more probable 
than the explanation that he was raised from the dead. None of these explanations is very 
probable, but they are more probable, just looking at the matter historically, than the 
explanation of the resurrection.295 
 
Moreover, it is crucial that historians demonstrate working knowledge of how supernatural 
explanations can be compared to natural ones and how philosophical considerations affect the 
likelihood of historical explanations in future studies on the Resurrection. I submit that Bayes’ 
theorem is a good starting point to lay out and increase transparency about these sorts of 
presuppositions and assessments. 
  
 
292 This thesis is of course limited by the number of historical facts that are considered. But the 
methodology outlined above allows for future studies to take advantage of considering additional potential facts 
such as the empty tomb, if so perceived or the likelihood of how the Christian message disseminated throughout the 
Roman empire. If additional facts are adduced to the case, this might have an impact of how strong arguments 
against God’s existence need to be such that a naturalistic hypothesis should be preferred. 
293 Quentin Smith, “The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo 4, no. 2 (2001): 197. 
294 Ehrman, Jesus, Interrupted, 175. 
295 Ibid., 176–177. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify how well the three major historical explanations 
explain a set of historical facts, all of which are well supported and accepted by a majority of 
scholars with various backgrounds. The explanations include one natural hypothesis, the 
subjective vision hypothesis, and two supernatural hypotheses, namely the objective vision and 
the RH. Moreover, the list of historical facts in need of an explanation include: (1) Jesus died by 
crucifixion, (2) various groups and individuals claimed that he appeared to them alive as the 
risen Christ, and (3) the former persecutor of the church, Saul of Tarsus, experienced a radical 
transformation after encountering Jesus on the road to Damascus. 
A Bayesian approach is preferred over an inference to the best explanation for the 
purposes of the present study because it allows us to take into account different aspects of 
worldview, particularly supernatural elements such as the belief in theism and the likelihood that 
such a God would raise Jesus from the dead. This methodology allows for considering under 
which circumstances a theistic explanation is more likely than the most probable natural 
explanations. 
The result of the study is that, unless it is extremely improbable that God exists and that 
He would raise Jesus from the dead,296 the explanation that Jesus was raised bodily after his death 
is the best explanation for the three historical facts herein considered. 
  
 
296 Note that the more precisely computed value is ≤ 0.0022. But, since the canon of probabilities (see 
table 2) only allows for a verbal classification of virtually impossible (0.000001) and extremely improbable (0.01), 
the value is rounded up. 
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Appendix 
 
Term Probability 
(in percent) 
Virtually impossible   0.0001 
Extremely improbable   1.0000 
Very improbable   5.0000 
Improbable 20.0000 
Slightly improbable 40.0000 
Even odds 50.0000 
Slightly probable 60.0000 
Probable 80.0000 
Very probable 95.0000 
Extremely probable 99.0000 
Virtually certain 99.9999 
Table 2. Canon of Probabilities297 
  
 
297 Carrier, Proving History, 286. 
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